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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
United States Navy Fleet Problems and the Development of  
 
Carrier Aviation, 1929-1933.  (August 2005) 
 
Ryan David Wadle, B. A., Iowa State University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Bradford 
 
 
 The U.S. Navy first took official notice of aviation in 1910, but its development 
of carrier aviation lagged behind Great Britain’s until the 1920s. The first American 
aircraft carrier, the Langley, commissioned in 1919, provided the Navy with a valuable 
platform to explore the potential uses of carrier aviation, but was usually limited to 
scouting and fleet air defense in the U.S. Navy’s annual interwar exercises called fleet 
problems. 
 This began to change in 1929 with the introduction of the carriers Lexington and 
Saratoga in Fleet Problem IX. After this exercise, which included a raid by aircraft from 
the Saratoga that “destroyed” the Pacific side of the Panama Canal, the carriers were 
assigned a wider variety of roles over the next five years of exercises. During this time, 
the carriers gained their independence from the battle line, which the smaller and slower 
Langley had been unable to do. Reflecting the advanced capabilities of the new carriers, 
the fleet problems conducted during Admiral William Veazie Pratt’s tenure as Chief of 
Naval Operations, 1930-1933, began to test the employment of the new carriers as the 
centerpiece of one of the opposing fleets within the exercises. The Lexington and 
Saratoga were used offensively during these exercises, employing their aircraft to sink 
   iv
surface ships, though not battleships, and successfully strike targets ashore. The carriers 
became successful in spite of the unreliability of early 1930s carrier aircraft, particularly 
the torpedo bombers, that could carry heavy payloads.    
 Lessons learned from the Lexington and Saratoga Fleet Problems IX through XIV 
influenced the design of the next generation of American aircraft carriers, the Yorktown-
class, which were authorized in 1933. These new carriers were faster and much larger 
than the carrier Ranger, commissioned in 1934 and designed before the Lexington and 
Saratoga began participating in the exercises. Features incorporated into the Yorktown-
class based on operational experience included the reduced need for large surface 
batteries because of the use of escort vessels, the emphasis of armoring against shellfire 
over aerial bombs and torpedoes, and the capability to launch large numbers of aircraft 
quickly. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Beginning in 1911, the year Eugene Ely became the first pilot to fly an airplane 
from the deck of a ship, the U.S. Navy’s interest in aviation steadily increased, and the 
outbreak of World War I quickened the pace of its development. Despite the growth of 
naval aviation, including some nascent bureaucratic support, the United States lagged 
behind other navies, particularly the British, in the development of naval aviation. The 
British, having experimented with hybrid carriers already, commissioned their first true 
aircraft carrier, the Argus, in 1918, but the United States did not allocate funds for one 
until 1919.1   
In the early 1920s, the United States Navy decided to take advantage of the 
annual fleet concentrations during the winter months to schedule exercises in which the 
lion’s share of the fleet would participate. The first exercise, known as Fleet Problem I, 
gave birth to a series of annual exercises that continued until the eve of World War II. 
The early years of the Fleet Problems saw only limited participation by aircraft, primarily 
because naval aviation remained in its infancy and the United States possessed only one 
carrier, the experimental Langley. The commissioning of the U.S. Navy’s second and 
third carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga, in 1927 allowed more sophisticated study of 
the roles that aviation could play in fleet operations. Beginning in 1929, the two new 
carriers, which had resulted from the Washington Naval Treaty, began participating in the 
annual exercises.   
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format of The Journal of American History.  
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 This study analyzes the participation of those carriers in Fleet Problems IX 
through XIV, which were held from 1929 to 1933. Although much has been written 
dealing with certain aspects of carrier operations in the Fleet Problems, particularly the 
impact of those fleet problems on the development of doctrine, no serious study has been 
made to catalogue the effects the carrier’s participation in the Fleet Problems on the 
design of future carriers, the way aviation was reported on in the media, or the political 
impact of the fleet problems. The employment of the carriers and the evolution of the 
scenarios in Fleet Problems IX through XIV reflect the interest of naval aviators in 
independent, offensive carrier airpower, which was manifested in the design of the 
Yorktown-class carriers. However, the publicity stemming from these Fleet Problems 
failed to increase the pace of carrier construction.  
By early 2005, there have been few in-depth studies of the Fleet Problems, or at 
least studies that look outward from the problems. The only previous study of the Fleet 
Problems, Francis L. Keith’s 1974 master’s thesis, “United States Navy Task Force 
Evolution: An Analysis of United States Fleet Problems, 1931-1934,” focuses, as its title 
suggests, on the transition of the Navy from one structured around a single battlefleet to 
one composed of multiple task forces. While Keith is effective in arguing his case, his 
thesis fails to examine other effects the Fleet Problems had upon the navy.1 
Another master’s thesis, Mark Allen Campbell’s  “The Influence of Air Power 
Upon the Battle Doctrine of the United States Navy, 1922-1941” (1991), expands Keith’s 
work by focusing on doctrine and concludes that the navy had not only developed a task 
                                                 
1 Francis Lovell Keith, “United States Navy Task Force Evolution: An Analysis of United States 
Fleet Problems, 1931-1934” (Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 1974). 
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force structure, but that it has also shifted from a battleship-oriented fleet to a balanced 
force structure by 1941. Campbell attaches great importance to the Fleet Problems, 
especially those between 1929 and 1940, which he correctly views as the Navy’s most 
important forum for testing theories about the usage of aircraft carriers. Some technical 
developments are covered, as well as the naval expansion of the late 1930s and early 
1940s that would have resulted, once all authorized ships entered service, in a balanced 
fleet with nearly equal numbers of carriers and battleships.2  
 Several published histories of naval aviation history discuss the Fleet Problems, 
but all have their limitations. Among the most noteworthy is Charles Melhorn’s Two 
Block Fox, which examines the rise of naval and carrier aviation in the U.S. Navy prior to 
1930. Melhorn argues that the carrier air power so successfully employed against the 
Japanese during World War II was developed during the interwar period. Melhorn’s 
narrative covers much of the early years of American naval aviation in great detail, but 
suddenly stops following the successful assault upon the Panama Canal during Fleet 
Problem IX in 1929. While this exercise clearly showed the potential of carrier aviation, 
the ships, the aircraft, and the doctrine needed to employ them remained in their infancy, 
and Melhorn does not discuss subsequent developments.3 
 Clark Reynolds’ The Fast Carriers acknowledges the importance of Fleet 
Problem IX and subsequent exercises in defining an offensive role for aircraft carriers 
and in highlighting the difficulties of having the carriers steam in company with the 
                                                 
2 Mark Allen Campbell, “The Influence of Air Power Upon the Evolution of Battle Doctrine in the 
U.S. Navy, 1922-1941” (Master’s thesis, University of Massachusetts at Boston, 1992). 
 
3 Charles Melhorn, Two Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929 (Annapolis, 
1974). 
4 
slower battleships. However, Reynolds’ devotes less than ten percent of his nearly 500 
pages to the interwar era.  The bulk of his book describes how technology, the 
commissioning of a dozen Essex- and Independence-class carriers, and experience gained 
in wartime operations transformed carrier task forces from small, vulnerable formations 
into large, powerful strike forces by 1943.4  
A more recent publication, American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 
1919-1941, a collaborative effort between Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and 
Mark Mandeles, analyzes how the U.S. Navy first caught up with, then surpassed, Great 
Britain to become the leader in carrier aviation by the start of World War II. Focusing on 
institutional developments, the authors conclude that the key components of American 
success were the interactions between the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Naval War College, 
and fleet exercises, particularly the Fleet Problems.5 
Geoffrey Till’s article, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and 
Japanese Case Studies,” in Allan Millett and Williamson Murray’s Military Innovation in 
the Interwar Period focuses upon the British experience, with the other two nations used 
as counterpoints. He argues that, technically and administratively, a firm foundation 
developed for American carrier aviation during the interwar period, and that the United 
States viewed carriers as a means to protect the fleet against air attack during a 
hypothetical Pacific campaign. Though he acknowledges the simulated carrier strikes on 
                                                 
4 Clark Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New York, 1968).  
 
5 Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and Mark Mandeles, American and British Aircraft Carrier 
Development, 1919-1941 (Annapolis, 1999). 
 
5 
the Panama Canal in 1929 and Pearl Harbor in 1932, Till argues that carrier 
vulnerabilities prevented the formation of carrier task forces in the 1930s.6  
Thomas Wildenberg’s Destined for Glory traces the development of one form of 
carrier aviation, that of dive-bombing, that culminated in the stunning success at Midway 
in 1942. The book describes of naval aviation’s development in the interwar period, with 
exercises, aircraft development, and doctrinal evolution. As such, it describes several 
Fleet Problems, but gives most only given cursory examinations.7   
Wildenberg and Reynolds have also written biographies of two pioneer naval 
aviators that also cover certain aspects of the Fleet Problems. Wildenberg’s All the 
Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Airpower 
examines the Fleet Problems Reeves participated in, with special attention devoted to 
Reeves’ role in Fleet Problem IX.  Reynolds’ biography, Admiral John H. Towers: The 
Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy, discusses Towers’ participation in the exercises, 
particularly Grand Joint Exercise 4 and Fleet Problem XIII in 1932. Both books are 
excellent studies of the men and interwar naval aviation as a whole, but are hampered by 
the fact that neither man participated in all of the 1929-1933 Fleet Problems.8    
                                                 
6 Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case 
Studies,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Allan. R. Millett and Williamson Murray 
(New York, 1996), 191-226.   
 
7 Thomas Wildenberg, Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier 
Air Power (Annapolis, 1998). 
 
8 Thomas Wildenberg, All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins 
of Carrier Air Power (Washington, 2003); Clark Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for 
Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis, 1991). 
6 
While all of these works provide valuable insight into limited aspects of the Fleet 
Problems, the Fleet Problems themselves are not the focus of any of studies, and those 
that do focus on the exercises are too narrowly focused on doctrine. 
The most important primary source material are reproduced in the microfilm 
series Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems 1923-1941, which contains 
a variety of documents culled from several different National Archives record groups. 
The Reports to the Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS) are of particular 
importance because they include descriptions of the scenarios and force structures 
heading into each problem, narratives of the actual exercise, and critiques of the methods 
and forces involved following the problem’s conclusion. 
The Annual Reports of Fleets and Task Forces of the US Navy, 1920-1941 were 
examined to determine how the commanders of the fleet, the Battle Force, and Scouting 
Force evaluated the value of air operations in their reports. Records of the Joint Board, 
1903-1947 provided some information on joint exercises between the Army and Navy.  
Record Group 80 at the National Archives, which contains the textual records for 
the Navy Department, gave insight to General Board decisions during the period, 
particularly serials discussing a specific issue. Supplementing these records is Record 
Group 8 from the Naval Historical Collection at the Naval War College in Newport, 
Rhode Island, Intelligence and Technical Archives, 1885-1982, which includes 
significant information about Grand Joint Exercise 4, and the personal paper collections 
of William Pratt and Harry Yarnell, two of the key participants in the exercises from 
1929 to 1933.  
7 
To gauge the political importance of the Fleet Problems, pertinent volumes of The 
Congressional Record were used to analyze how the Fleet Problems were cited in 
Congressional debates.  Contemporary newspapers and professional journals, such as the 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and the New York Times, were consulted to measure the 
publicity afforded the Fleet Problems.  
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CHAPTER II 
 NAVAL AVIATION, 1910-1928 
 Despite the success of the Wright brothers and other aviation pioneers, it was not 
until 1908 that the U.S. Navy took any official interest in aviation. This is somewhat 
understandable, given the unreliable engines and short flight times of the aircraft in 
existence at the time. However, it would still take two more years for the navy to gain 
any practical experience with aircraft.  
 In late 1910 the Navy finally began to take steps to harness aviation for its 
purposes. On 14 November, Eugene Ely, a test pilot for Glenn Curtiss, took to the air 
from a temporary wooden platform placed upon the bow of the cruiser Birmingham. 
Curtiss had feared what a failed attempt might do to his efforts to sell aircraft to the 
military, but the flight was not a failure, nor was it a rallying point to force the military 
into giving aviation massive support. Two months later, on 18 January 1911, Ely made a 
second flight in which he landed, and then took off again, from the deck of the armored 
cruiser Pennsylvania. By 4 March the navy was interested enough in the potential of 
aviation that it allocated $25,000 for the purchase of naval aircraft. In another sign of the 
importance accorded aviation, Captain Washington Irving Chambers, who had been 
informally working to further aviation for the much of 1910, was given a place in the 
Bureau of Navigation. 1    
Following Ely’s successful test flights, the next period of aviation dealt primarily 
with the training of the first navy fliers, beginning in 1911 at San Diego and Annapolis 
                                                 
1 Archibald Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New York, 
1972), 15.  
 9 
and continuing over the next two years at those locations, as well as at Hammondsport, 
New York, the site of Glenn Curtiss’ aviation school and test center. Among these early 
aviators was John H. Towers, who would reach the rank of admiral and hold several key 
positions during his storied career.2 
During this period, Admiral Bradley Fiske, a noted advocate of naval reforms and 
a brilliant technical innovator in naval gunnery, pushed a plan in 1911 to defend the 
Philippines with torpedo planes. Not surprisingly, Fiske’s superiors quickly shelved the 
plan. Despite the rebuff, the quest to create a workable torpedo plane would occupy much 
of Fiske’s time in later years.3 
The next leaps forward occurred in 1914. Early that year, the old battleship 
Mississippi, with Lieutenant Commander Henry Mustin in command, was chosen to 
become the first test ship for aviation operations in the fleet. Mustin would take the ship 
to the new naval station created specifically for flight training at Pensacola, Florida. In 
April, as a flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral William S. Sims was visiting the 
station, orders were received to take aircraft to Tampico, Mexico, and the Mississippi was 
ordered to Vera Cruz. Soon after its arrival off Vera Cruz on 24 April, a plane was 
launched to scout the harbor, marking the first time an American aircraft flew during a 
combat situation. Further flights from both detachments were uneventful, and the 
Mississippi left Mexican waters to return to Pensacola on 13 June with all its aircraft.4 
                                                 
2 Clark Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis, 
1991), 33-44.   
 
3 Paolo E. Coletta, Admiral Bradley Fiske and the American Navy (Lawrence, 1979), 94-95.  
 
4 George Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet: A Narrative of Naval Aviation’s Early Development 
(Annapolis, 1966),  108-111.  
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 On the administrative side, Chambers had repeatedly requested, without success, 
the creation of an Office of Aeronautics, and thus he was still functioning with little more 
than the meager support he received when he took his post. Fiske apparently concluded 
that Chambers was not a strong enough advocate for naval aviation, and engineered his 
replacement in December 1913 by Captain Mark Bristol. Fiske apparently assumed that 
Bristol’s expertise with ordinance might be of value to aviation, but Bristol’s record 
appears to have been mixed. While Chambers had only flown briefly, he had sought to 
gain the ear of the pilots and tried to view their concerns from their vantage point. On the 
other hand, Bristol assumed that detachment would be the most suitable approach to his 
job, and often times ignored the wishes, or even sound practical experience, of the pilots. 
For instance, Bristol appears to have been quite unresponsive for a time to the pilots’ 
requests to replace their pusher aircraft with tractor-type engines, with the delay leading 
to the deaths of several naval aviators. However, Bristol did attempt to gain a much larger 
and more permanent foothold for aviation within the bureaucracy, if for no other reason 
than for personal advancement. Ultimately, the infancy of the technology, when 
combined with a change in the naval hierarchy, dashed Bristol’s hopes, and he lacked the 
charisma of later aviation leaders like William Moffett to combat the changes. 5  
During these early years of naval aviation, the lack of a solid institutional base 
proved to be a problem for those attempting to advance the cause of aviation. Fiske, 
                                                 
5 The views on Bristol are decidedly mixed. For a negative appraisal, see George Van Deurs’ 
Wings for the Fleet. A more positive, and perhaps more objective account since Van Deurs was a former 
aviator himself, is Clifford L. Lord and Archibald Turnbull’s History of United States Naval Aviation; 
Captain Mark Bristol to Cmdr. Henry C. Mustin, 16 April 1915, box 6, Henry C. Mustin Papers, (Library 
of Congress, Washington D.C.).  The exact quote from the pusher, tractor debate is “I hope you will not use 
up too much time on arguments in regard to tractors and pushers, because arguments not based on facts and 
evidence will waste your time and mine. As far as I can find out from all information abroad, the tractor is 
doomed for military purposes.” 
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though an aviation advocate, had little difficulty usurping the limited authority that 
Chambers had possessed. Though Bristol had assumed the title of Director of Naval 
Aeronautics, aviation was still not entirely autonomous from the bureaus that dominated 
the naval bureaucracy. The lack of a solid footing left aviation quite susceptible to 
personal whims and biases, as in the case of Admiral William S. Benson, the first Chief 
of Naval Operations.  
Benson, a captain, was selected ahead of numerous admirals, including Fiske, to 
become the first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1916 because Fiske, who had 
occupied the predecessor post of Aid for Operations, had run afoul of Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels too many times. Creation of the CNO position was intended to 
bring order to the naval bureaucracy and to alleviate the concerns of many in the navy 
that its seventy year old bureau structure was inadequate to plan for and eventually to 
fight a successful conflict.  
Benson’s record during aviation’s formative years is decidedly mixed. Though his 
biographer claims he was interested in aviation, his contemporaries did not always share 
that sentiment. Aviation’s institutional support was degraded under Benson when 
Bristol’s post as Director of Naval Aeronautics was eliminated, and Bristol’s role as 
Commander, Air Service, became more of an operational position aboard the battleship 
North Carolina, which had replaced the Mississippi as the aviation vessel. Even a report 
from the General Board critical of the navy stance towards aviation did not greatly alter 
the situation. In defense of Benson, naval aviation would expand rapidly on his watch 
 12 
during World War I, and he also fought postwar attempts to create an independent, 
unified air service.6  
Before the United States entered the war, Towers and other aviators served as 
attachés and reported to officials in Washington that European aircraft designs were far 
superior to those in America. In 1916 naval aviation received a substantial funding 
increase, though not as large as many hoped because Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels sought from Congress far less than had been requested by uniformed members of 
the navy. American entry into the war in April 1917 finally spurred the sort of expansion 
that aviation advocates had wanted for some time. Training and procurement were 
stepped up immensely, to the point that over 37,000 officers and men trained as pilots or 
technicians during the war.7  
The first detachment of planes and pilots arrived in France in June 1917 under 
Lieutenant Ken Whiting. Over the next year, the buildup of aviation units in Northern 
Europe and Italy continued, but the desire to train more pilots and difficulties in 
determining the proper placement and role of aircraft combined delayed their combat 
debut so that it was not until the last few months of the war that these aviation units 
finally saw service. Attacks against various land targets, conducted primarily by Marine 
                                                 
6 Mary Klachko, Admiral William Shepherd Benson (Annapolis, 1987), 44-46; John Fass Morton: 
Mustin: A Naval Family of the Twentieth Century (Annapolis, 2003), 81, 105-106. This transfer was 
especially difficult for Mustin given the cold relations between him and Bristol stemming from Bristol’s 
seeming inability to properly provide for the needs of the Pensacola station; Turnbull and Lord, History of 
United States Naval Aviation , 64; Klachko, Admiral William Shepherd Benson, 167.  
 
7 Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, 147.  
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aviators, as well as 25 attacks against submarines by patrol aircraft, were the primary 
areas of American naval aviation combat during the war.8   
During and immediately after World War I, numerous hearings were held before 
the General Board regarding the status and potential of naval aviation. Most leading naval 
aviators, including Mustin, Whiting, and Towers, testified before the board, whose 
members appear to have been skeptical of those who believed that aviation held promise 
not just in a support role but also as another means of attack against an opposing force. 
Whatever differences may have existed between the General Board and naval aviators on 
the proper role of aircraft carriers did not prevent the Board from recommending the 
conversion of the collier Jupiter in April 1919.9 
The immediate postwar period was dominated by the efforts of Brigadier General 
William Mitchell to establish air service independent from the army and the navy. An 
attempt was made to obtain congressional support for an independent air force in 
December 1918, but it failed. Mitchell, upon his return from Europe in early 1919, 
intensified his own lobbying efforts, even to the point of saying that navies would 
become obsolete in the face of overwhelming airpower. During the next two years, 
Mitchell and his supporters’ calls for an independent air service never abated, and 
Mitchell himself also appeared during the 1919 General Board hearings. 
In the midst of the controversy concerning aviation, the Navy had decided to 
expend the old battleship Indiana in tests designed to simulate air attacks upon 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 119-141.  
 
9 Perhaps the most notable instance of this came during the 1922 hearings, in which the Board was 
skeptical, almost hostile, to the idea of a carrier as an independent strike weapon. See Proceedings and 
Hearings of the General Board, 1900-1950  (microfilm, 28 reels, National Archives, 1987), reel 16, volume 
2, pp 26-52; Ibid., reel 14, volume 2, p. 26.  
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compartmented warships. The tests upon the Indiana involved dropping dummy bombs 
by aircraft, and then placing explosive charges simulating bomb explosions on and near 
the ship. The navy, which conducted the tests between 14 October and 1 November 1920, 
sought to keep the trials secret, but photos of damage to the Indiana caused by the 
explosive charges leaked to the public. Mitchell exploited the situation by stating in 
Congressional testimony in early 1921 that, “We can tell you definitely now that we can 
either destroy or sink any ship in existence today.”10  
The flurry of controversy resulting from Mitchell’s appearances before Congress 
led Secretary of the Navy Daniels on 1 March to order new bombing tests be carried out 
on the old battleship Iowa and several former German warships, including the battleship 
Ostfriesland, the cruiser Frankfurt, the destroyer G-102, and three U-Boats. The U-Boats 
were the first vessels sunk in the tests, which began on 20 June 1921. Navy aircraft 
participated in the tests on the Iowa on 29 June that involved an aerial search for the 
battleship, which was rigged with a radio-control system allowing it to move, and aerial 
attacks were launched using dummy bombs. On 13 July, Mitchell led an attack on the G-
102, sinking it in twenty minutes. On 18 July the Frankfurt sank after attacks by both 
army and navy planes. For the tests on the Ostfriesland, Mitchell ignored the prearranged 
rules, which provided for an assessment of damage in between attacks and sank the 
former German battleship with 1,000 and 2,000-pound bombs on 20-21 July 1921. The 
tests on the German ships were hardly conclusive, given that the vessels had no means to 
defend themselves, no escort, no damage control crews, and were at anchor in clear 
                                                 
10 Charles Melhorn, Two Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929 (Annapolis, 
1974), 60-62. Quote is from p. 61.   
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weather.  Mitchell conducted similar tests against the retired battleship Alabama two 
months later. Mitchell’s campaign received major publicity from the bombing tests, but 
the Navy strengthened its campaign to retain control of naval aviation by establishing the 
Bureau of Aeronautics during the same time as the tests were being conducted.11 
Ironically, Mitchell’s quest to form a unified air service spurred the navy’s top 
commanders to finally push for a permanent aviation bureau within the navy. As Charles 
Melhorn argues, those in the Navy who may have seen little potential in aviation’s future 
strongly resented an outsider attempting to take control of a portion of their service even 
more than they may have resented upstart fliers pushing for weapon systems of limited 
power.12 Thus, Mitchell’s efforts finally united a substantial portion of the navy’s senior 
officers behind the creation of an independent bureau on 10 July 1921.  There would be 
occasional efforts to create an independent air service, but the idea lay largely dormant 
for two decades following Mitchell’s court martial in 1926. 
The first chief of the new Bureau of Aeronautics, Rear Admiral William A. 
Moffett, actually began serving as the aviation adviser within the Office of the CNO four 
months prior to the bureau’s creation. Though Moffett was a relative latecomer to 
aviation, he quickly became a tireless advocate for all forms of naval aviation, including 
carrier aviation. Moffett proved so successful that he was reappointed to head the Bureau 
twice before his premature death in the crash of the airship Akron in 1933 that brought his 
stellar career to an end.  
                                                 
11 Ibid., 63, 70-72; Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, 193, 201. 
 
12 Melhorn, Two Block Fox, 56-57.  
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Although the new bureau wielded much more power than its predecessors, the 
Bureau of Aeronautics still did not have the total control over all aviation matters that its 
advocates had hoped for. For instance, the Bureau of Navigation still exerted some 
influence over personnel matters in naval aviation, and other bureaus affected the 
procurement of such essential components of air warfare as ordinance and radios. As 
John Towers protested to the Morrow Board in 1925, “Officers seem to feel that the 
Bureau is in a position of being burdened with complete responsibility without complete 
authority.”13 
In November 1921, deliberations concerning naval disarmament began at the 
Washington Conference. Moffett, as a part of a subcommittee devoted to aircraft matters, 
persuaded the delegates to resist proposed limitations on aircraft development. Initially, 
the proposed limits for aircraft carrier tonnage were set at 80,000 tons while abiding to 
the 5:5:3 ratio agreed upon for American, British, and Japanese capital ships. Pressure 
from the British delegation and his own naval advisors forced Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes to raise the carrier tonnage limit to 135,000 tons. All three of the major 
naval powers could convert two battlecruisers slated for scrapping into aircraft carriers, 
with the two American conversions eventually materializing as the Lexington and 
Saratoga. Although the delegates agreed upon a 27,000-ton limit for each carrier, the 
American naval advisors successfully raised the limit on carrier conversions to 33,000 
tons, as well as adding a clause allowing for an additional 3,000 tons of modifications for 
existing vessels that kept the two American conversions within treaty limits.  
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Clearly, carrier aviation benefited from the conference by ultimately receiving the 
pair of battlecruiser conversions. Additionally, Mark Allen Campbell argues that the 
Five-Power Naval Treaty and subsequent naval limitations treaties indirectly benefited 
carrier aviation by retarding battleship development for 15 years, which freed up funds 
for carriers and aircraft. Regardless of the benefits received, the treaty limits upon aircraft 
carriers seriously impacted the development of carrier aviation for the remainder of the 
interwar period.14  
For all of the gains, in terms of the practical experience in designing, constructing, 
and operating naval aircraft, as well as the growth of naval aviation as a legitimate arm of 
the U.S. Navy, it was not until the late 1920s that several important steps were taken that 
would ensure naval aviation’s place within the navy.  
 Perhaps the most important institutional change was brought about by the Morrow 
Board’s recommendations of November 1925. The Morrow Board, chaired by Dwight 
Morrow, had been created by President Calvin Coolidge to examine the whole of military 
aviation, and, due to its mostly civilian makeup, promised to be a Board with little bias 
toward either the Army or the Navy. In the end, the Morrow Board came down firmly on 
the side of fostering aviation growth and is sued many key recommendations. Once 
Congress acted upon these recommendations, naval aviation’s future was secured.  
Perhaps the most prominent of these was the creation of a construction program 
of 1,000 aircraft to be completed by 1931. This program, while a great boost to naval 
aviation, led to some later confusion as to whether the 1,000-plane limit was intended as 
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an upper limit for all naval aircraft. In 1934, Congress cleared up this confusion by 
appropriating funds for a total of 1,650 aircraft.15 
Another key change was the passage of a law providing that all aircraft carriers, 
seaplane tenders, and aviation shore stations must be commanded by aviators. This action 
opened career paths for aviators to reach positions of command equal to those of surface 
warfare officers who at the time dominated the upper command structure of the navy. 16 
 Following the release of the Morrow Board’s findings, the Navy formed the 
Taylor Board and ordered its members to make recommendations concerning use of the 
funds appropriated by Congress in the Naval Aviation Expansion Act of 1926. Under the 
leadership of Read Admiral Montgomery M. Taylor, the board recommended the 
construction of additional aircraft carriers and the procurement of specialized aircraft 
types rather than attempting to combine functions in aircraft that could potentially be 
satisfactory at none of its intended roles.17   
During this same period, Joseph Reeves, a respected naval officer for nearly three 
decades, joined naval aviation. His exact reasons for entering aviation at the age of 53 are 
not entirely clear, and his prior experience with aviation was less than that of other senior 
officers, but he would become one the leading figures of naval aviation over the next 
several years. Reeves’ point of entry was the aviation observer course that Moffett had 
designed with mid and senior-level naval officers in mind. Rather than having to go 
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through the full training process of a new pilot, which was difficult even for men half 
Reeves’ age, the observer course was much shorter and much less grueling.  
 From 1925 to 1928, Reeves’ focus in his duties as Commander, Aircraft 
Squadrons, Battle Fleet, was the Langley, it being the end result of the conversion of the 
collier Jupiter. Though the carrier had been engaged in flight operations for the three 
years since commissioning, it was Reeves who made the first real efforts to integrate the 
operations of the Langley with those of the rest of the fleet. When he first observed them, 
Reeves felt that the operations on the Langley lacked discipline and would require a 
number of changes before the ship could become a functional fighting unit. The Morrow 
Board was meeting at this time and both General Mitchell and his supporters in Congress 
were questioning the ability of the navy to develop adequately the potential of aviation. 
Reeves created what became known as the “Thousand and One Questions” which asked 
questions covering a wide array of topics concerning carrier operations. It was felt that 
these questions must be answered before the ship and its complement would be ready to 
function with the fleet.18    
The primary way Reeves sought to change the Langley from a laboratory to a 
warship was by dramatically increasing the carrier’s complement of aircraft, which had 
usually around six to eight aircraft, and by increasing the rate of takeoffs and landings 
from the Langley’s flight deck. In his efforts to do so, he found himself at odds with other 
aviators, Towers among them, who objected to the increased takeoff and landing rates 
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due to safety concerns. However, Reeves overrode those concerns, and within a year, the 
Langley routinely carried 20 aircraft or more. By June 1927, Reeves believed that the 
Langley might be able to carry as many as 48 aircraft in case of war. These dramatic 
increases in aircraft handling capacity were brought about by increased efficiency from 
the deck crew in between aircraft launches and landings resulting from the use of a “deck 
park,” i.e., using moving aircraft to a section of the deck not needed for takeoffs and 
landings rather than taking time to lower them to the hanger deck.” Several minutes 
between takeoffs or landings meant that even a carrier like Langley with only a minimal 
aircraft complement could sometimes require a half hour or more to land its air group. 
Rather than spending the time to land each aircraft on deck and then lower it to the 
hangar, the planes would be placed on the forward portions of the flight deck while the 
remaining aircraft landed. This advance led to the regular placement of significant  
portions of a carrier’s aircraft upon the flight deck.19     
Even before the Navy had experience operating the Lexington and Saratoga, the 
two carriers that were constructed on the hulls of battlecruisers that entered service in late 
1927, the characteristics of the Ranger, the first American carrier designed for that 
purpose from the hull up, were agreed upon. The plans for the Ranger were influenced by 
experiences gained operating the Langley and by a series of tactical simulations 
conducted by the Naval War College in the mid-1920s. From those simulations, the 
Naval War College concluded that the ability to get the largest number of aircraft into the 
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air in the shortest amount of time would determine the success of an operation. There was 
also the common fear of placing too many eggs in one basket, which is what 
concentrating a fleet’s entire air strength in one or two large carriers rather than four 
smaller ones, had the potential to do. Since the Lexington and Saratoga took up nearly 
half the 135,000 tons for carriers allowed for the U.S. Navy under the Washington 
Treaty, this meant that smaller, more efficient platforms would be needed to provide the 
maximum number of carriers. Hence, it appeared wiser to build several small carriers—
the Ranger displaced 13,800 tons—rather than construct a smaller number of larger 
carriers the size of the 33,000-ton Saratoga and Lexington. Once all three carriers entered 
service, operational experience would eventually alter this position. 20  
Thus, at the time of the introduction of the Lexington and Saratoga to the fleet in 
1928, naval aviation had gained a solid footing within the navy. Even though the United 
States lagged behind other nations, such as Great Britain, during World War I and its 
immediate aftermath, the lost ground was quickly made up during the 1920s. Though the 
U.S. Navy’s carrier fleet was still embryonic and entirely dependant upon the limited 
Langley, some key institutional and operational hurdles had been overcome by 1929. 
While its existence was no longer in doubt, the precise role or roles that aviation would 
play in naval warfare remained to be determined. Key to determining the role of aviation 
were the naval exercises and Fleet Problems of the inner war period, particularly Fleet 
Problems IX through XIV conducted from 1929 to 1933. 
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CHAPTER III  
PREVIOUS EXERCISES, 1889-1928 
While practicing and drilling had long been a part of naval training, exercises for 
the modern United States Navy did not begin until 1889, when, in order to prepare the 
navy for the transition from wind propulsion to steam, the navy’s most modern vessels 
were combined into a single squadron. The Squadron of Evolution, as it was known, 
comprised the “ABC” protected cruisers, Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, along with the 
smaller gunboat Yorktown. The largest and most powerful ship in the squadron was its 
flagship, the Chicago, which displaced about 4,500 tons but had both armament and 
armor that were unimpressive when measured by the current standards of European 
fleets. The relative weakness of the squadron was readily apparent when, during its first 
cruise, the Squadron visited eleven major European ports between December 1889 and 
the spring of 1890. 
Though the tour was probably the most impressive display of American naval 
power since the Civil War, the squadron’s commander, Rear Admiral John Walker, 
seemed to be well aware of the qualitative disparity of his ships in relation to those of the 
European fleets. Walker noted in a letter to the Navy Department following mechanical 
troubles in the Yorktown that, “I should hesitate to go to a foreign yard or ship and 
disclose to foreign mechanics this wretched job as a specimen of American work.” 
Following the conclusion of this European cruise, the Squadron returned home by way of 
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South America and continued to cruise as a single unit until 1892 when the ships were 
incorporated into the North Atlantic Squadron. 1  
The most important function of the squadron was to instruct American sailors in 
the art of formation steaming and other essential drills, all of which were practiced as the 
squadron moved from port to port.2 These skills would be essential as the United States 
transitioned away from its traditional guerre de course strategy of commercial raiding 
and protection and towards a guerre de escadre strategy emphasizing fleet engagements. 
Yet there was a public relations angle to the visits, designed both to convince the 
American public that a stronger navy was needed, and also to send the message to 
European nations that American naval power was on the ascent.  
The Squadron of Evolution existed during a time of great naval expansion, both in 
the United States and abroad. Also, much like the later Fleet Problems, the Squadron of 
Evolution represented serious attempts by the Navy to learn the proper usage, tactically 
and technically, of new ship designs. However, since the U.S. Navy had failed to keep 
technological pace with European navies following the Civil War, the Americans had a 
long way to go to catch up with other navies. In addition to the aforementioned 
construction of the “ABC” cruisers, appropriations were made in 1886 for the first 
American battleships, the Maine and the Texas, both of which were commissioned in the 
early 1890s.  
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The spur to these developments was the rise of a navalist movement comprising 
commissioned naval officers and influential civilian leaders. The intellectual leaders of 
the movement were Commodore Stephen B. Luce and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
Both men had come of age in a post-Civil War naval establishment that had seen rapid 
European naval expansion while the United States Navy had become increasingly 
budget-conscious and technologically ossified. However, between the two men’s efforts 
at naval (and self) promotion, greater attention from influential Americans both in and 
out of politics resulted from their efforts. The attention reached a fevered pitch following 
the 1890 publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History 1660-1783, in which he chronicled the rise of British sea power, followed by a 
series of journal articles in which he advocated the expansion of American sea power. 
The naval buildup in the United States would prove advantageous during the Spanish-
American War when the more modern American squadrons vanquished the inferior 
Spanish squadrons in the Philippines and Cuba and ensured American victory in the 
conflict.    
Between the Spanish-American War and World War I, perhaps the most 
important exercise conducted by the U.S. Navy was the winter maneuvers of 1902 and 
1903. Unlike the prior Squadron of Evolution and most of the later Fleet Problems, this 
round of exercises was notable not for technological integration but for intended political 
impact. The maneuvers were conducted in the eastern Caribbean Sea in response to the 
blockade of Venezuela by Britain, Germany, and Italy following that Caribbean country’s 
inability to pay its foreign debts. Though quite small, the blockading fleet of only 14 
European ships still represented a serious challenge to American dominance in the 
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Western Hemisphere in the eyes of President Theodore Roosevelt. Much as the later Fleet 
Problems would do on a regular basis, the 1902/1903 maneuvers were notable for 
involving the lion’s share of the US Navy in commission and ready for sea at the time. In 
total, 54 ships participated in the maneuvers, and, as an added measure by President 
Roosevelt indicating the importance he attached to the situation, the fleet was placed 
under the command of the famed Admiral George Dewey. 3  
American naval leaders had recently begun developing a number of war plans and 
these exercises were, in effect, a test of Plan Black. The plan assumed that, in the event of 
hostilities, Germany would attempt to seize a base in the Caribbean, probably either Cuba 
or Puerto Rico, and then use that base to harass American commerce, as well as to attack 
American coastal cities. In response to a war with Germany, the American fleet was to 
reinforce Puerto Rico and then conduct a search for any approaching German fleet. A 
Naval War College search problem had been devised to determine the feasibility of 
search operations in the north Atlantic.  
During the search problem, the North Atlantic Squadron under Rear Admiral F. J. 
Higginson was to prevent the Black fleet under Rear Admiral George M. Sumner from 
reaching a major Caribbean port. Ships began to gather in Puerto Rico during the last 
week of November, and the problem began on 4 December. Admiral Sumner decided to 
divide his ships into two groups, with the slowest four vessels approaching Mayaquez, 
Puerto Rico, from the south, while the remainder of the fleet approached from the north. 
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Sumner’s plan proved effective, and both elements of his fleet managed to elude 
detection by the Blue fleet and reached anchor at Mayaguez on 9 December.4  
Dewey did not join the fleet until 8 December, one day before the completion of 
the search problem. He was present for the maneuvers that were conducted off the coast 
of Puerto Rico until 20 December in which the reconstituted fleet practiced landings on 
the Puerto Rican coast. The fleet was dispersed over Christmas, but reorganized for a 
final week of tactical drills that ended on 5 January 1903.5  
Roosevelt would later claim that he sent an ultimatum to the German ambassador 
during the maneuvers, though the existence of such an ultimatum is still a matter of 
historical debate. Dewey believed the presence of his fleet had intimidated Germany into 
backing away from the crisis, which ended in January 1903. According to George Baer, 
the end of the crisis resulted more from Germany’s isolation following British withdrawal 
due to some concessions by Venezuela than from the American naval maneuvers. In any 
case, soon after the conclusion of the exercises, Admiral Dewey called for further 
American naval expansion and requested 48 new battleships at a rate of four per year to 
be constructed as a part of the “General Naval Scheme.” Congress did not fund such an 
ambitious building program but by 1905 had authorized construction of 10 battleships 
and 21 smaller warships.6  
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The most important result of the 1902/1903 maneuvers was the change in 
American deployment patterns. Though the fleet had become more concentrated during 
the previous decade, it was still based upon squadron detachments that harkened back to 
the days of sail. Following the exercises, the squadron system remained, but all 
battleships, even those in the Pacific, were consolidated into the North Atlantic Fleet in 
order to facilitate better training. This was a response to comments like those of 
Commander Nathan Sargent, an aide to Admiral Dewey, who stated that, “…the 
formations, both in line and in column, were ragged, distance and guide being badly kept, 
speed not well regulated and turns unskillfully executed.”7 
There were regular naval exercises leading up to and following American 
involvement in World War I, but none reached the level of importance that previous or 
later exercises achieved. However, it was during this period that aviation began to make 
appearances during fleet maneuvers. The first such exercise where aviation participated 
occurred in January 1913. The General Board had recommended that the infant aviation 
force travel with the fleet during its annual trip southward into warmer waters. The first 
use of naval aircraft in a scouting role occurred on 6 March 1913 when Lieutenant John 
Towers used one of the aircraft to scout an “enemy” battleship formation. Unfortunately, 
the wireless transmitter that Towers had installed aboard the aircraft failed to work, so the 
fleet did not receive his warnings. Other tests during these maneuvers included practice 
bombing runs, aerial photography, and sightings of submerged submarines. In an effort to 
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stimulate interest in naval aviation among officers, several officers flew as passengers in 
the planes. Thus, the first operations of aircraft with the fleet proved a success.8 
The other significant prewar interaction between the fleet and aviation occurred in 
the spring of 1916 when the North Carolina, which was the ship assigned to transport and 
test aircraft operations at the time, joined the fleet off Guantanamo for a round of 
exercises. Mock air attacks and reconnaissance missions were practiced, and some efforts 
were made to develop a doctrine for aerial spotting of battleship gunfire. Technical 
problems with the aircraft engines, radios, and the North Carolina’s catapult plagued air 
operations throughout the exercises. The procedures to accomplish the various tasks were 
also found to be wanting. In comparison to the positive experiences during the 1913 
exercises and the 1914 deployment of the four aircraft of the navy’s 1st and 2nd Aero 
Sections to Mexico, during which they flew reconnaissance missions over occupied Vera 
Cruz, this exercise was not nearly as successful for aviation. 9   
Aviation did not become a permanent fixture in naval exercises until after World 
War I, when it was integrated into the Fleet Problems of the interwar era. In the years 
following the war, exercises were held during the “concentration” period when both the 
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets would train together during the winter months, usually in the 
Caribbean or near Panama. After the change in fleet organization from the Atlantic and 
Pacific Fleets to the Battle Fleet and Scouting Fleet arrangement in late 1922, the 
concentrations and exercises were formalized as the Fleet Problem system. The Battle 
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Fleet, composed of the newest battleships and all aircraft carriers, was stationed in the 
Pacific, and the Scouting Fleet, composed mostly of older battleships, was stationed in 
the Atlantic.10  
The Fleet Problems became the most comprehensive and constant of the various 
interwar exercise systems, and at least one was held every year from 1923 onwards. Only 
the Grand Joint Exercises conducted in cooperation with the Army were nearly as large 
or complex, but this system came to a halt, with one major exception, after 1925. In total, 
twenty-one Fleet Problems were held, with Fleet Problem XXII being canceled in 1941 
due to the hostile international situation. Though many other exercises were staged 
during the interwar period with army cooperation, the Fleet Problems were more 
important for the Navy because they allowed the Navy to test both strategic and tactical 
applications of naval power under a wide variety of scenarios. The Scouting Fleet and the 
Battle Fleet usually comprised the opposing fleets, one being the friendly Blue Fleet and 
the other being the hostile Black Fleet; with transfers between the two forces taking place 
to achieve the desired mix of forces. During the 1920s, defense of the Panama Canal 
Zone was a frequent basis for many of the Fleet Problems. Thus, many Fleet Problems 
were held off the western coast of Central America or in the Caribbean, although the 
eastern Pacific waters between Hawaii and California eventually became a frequented 
location. 
 In fact, a simulated attack and defense upon the Panama Canal was the scenario 
for Fleet Problem I. Since the Langley was not yet ready to participate in exercises, the 
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battleships Oklahoma and New York were designated as “constructive” carriers. A single 
floatplane from each of the battleships represented the entire air groups that would later 
be carried by the Lexington and Saratoga. The strikes upon the Gatun Dam spillway by 
the floatplanes were judged to be successful, but it was difficult for anyone in the Navy 
or the other services to take the strikes seriously. One reason for this was the fact that 
seaplanes possessed a much larger radius of action than did any carrier aircraft at the 
time, and this would remain true of all carrier-borne attack aircraft until the eve of World 
War II. Another reason was the simple fact that a single floatplane is unlikely to elicit the 
same response from the defending forces that a flight of attack aircraft would. The lack of 
a concerted response by defenders in response to “constructive” air attacks was a problem 
that would be repeated during Fleet Problem IX several years later. However, it was 
important that a recommendation was made following the exercise to speed up the 
acquisition of aircraft carriers, specifically a “large and fast vessel.”11 
 Fleet Problem II was the first problem the Langley was present for, although it did 
not participate in the problem itself. Instead, officers aboard the ship observed the 
exercise so that the Navy could determine the best way for it to participate in future 
Problems. Though not assigned to either fleet, the Langley sent a formation of aircraft 
over the Isthmus to photograph installations, and several aircraft simulated a torpedo 
attack upon the harbor at Porto Bello. This demonstration was supposed to illustrate the 
vulnerability of ships in a confined harbor to air attack, but senior naval leaders do not 
                                                 
11 “U.S. Fleet Problem I, February 1923, Report of the Commander in Chief,” Records Relating to 
United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923-1941 (microfilm, 36 reels, National Archives, 1974) 
reel 1, 140. 
 31 
appear to have been impressed by the attack and the Langley’s presence was barely 
mentioned in the post-exercise critique.12   
 Overall, the Langley’s career in the early Fleet Problems was undistinguished. 
The carrier was frequently assigned to scout and provide air protection to the fleet during 
the exercises. The Langley even had difficulties accomplishing those missions since it 
could only steam at 16 knots, which was slower than even the battle line could travel. 
Thus, the carrier often had to leave the formation to launch aircraft in support of its 
mission. Even after Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves worked to increase the Langley’s air 
complement to 36, the relative lack of aircraft meant that the carrier, by necessity, was 
limited to the basic protection role that conservative naval officers envisioned for aircraft 
carriers. The navy simply did not possess enough carrier-borne aircraft to pose a 
significant threat to an enemy fleet or to accomplish a wide variety of missions. The 
Langley’s limitations in aircraft complement and speed also meant that even if its 
commanding officer or other carrier advocates chose to devise aggressive or independent 
missions, its handicaps would almost certainly prevent it from carrying out those 
missions. Thus, the role played by the Langley in the early fleet problems served to 
reinforce the views of anyone unconvinced of the importance of carriers in future naval 
conflicts.    
In light of its early service, the Langley could be seen as the forerunner to the 
escort carriers that would prove vital for convoy protection duties during World War II, a 
fact not lost upon the navy. As early as 1928, Admiral Moffett saw the value of 
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converting merchant ships into aviation vessels similar to the Langley as an efficient and 
effective means to, “…offer very serious menace to subsurface and surface craft.” 13 
One of the few instances of the Langley overcoming its handicaps occurred in a 
joint Army-Navy exercise held immediately before Fleet Problem VII in early March 
1927. The carrier, which was under the command of Admiral Reeves, was to support a 
naval attack upon the Panama Canal’s Pacific defenses. Rather than merely accepting the 
standard role of fleet air defense and artillery spotting for the Langley and its aircraft, 
Reeves used his aircraft to escort and assist a strike by amphibious aircraft against Army 
airfields. Bad weather and aircraft problems limited the size of the strike, but in the eyes 
of the umpires evaluating the exercise, it succeeded in eliminating the Army aircraft 
tasked with defending the Pacific side of the canal. According to Thomas Wildenberg, 
Reeves’ superiors attached a great deal of importance to the tempo of the Langley’s air 
operations since twenty aircraft had been launched in ten minutes.14 Later that month, 
during the course of Fleet Problem VII, Reeves launched an air attack upon enemy 
destroyers, but the aggressive nature of these two strikes were the exception and not the 
rule to the Langley’s career in the Fleet Problems.  
Typical of the Langley’s experiences were those of Fleet Problem VIII, held in 
April 1928. Both the Lexington and Saratoga were still working up to join the fleet at that 
time, and Langley, the only aviation vessel, was assigned to scout for the Black Fleet as it 
attempted to launch an invasion of Hawaii. The exercise was uneventful for the Langley, 
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though the carrier did launch a surprise air raid upon Pearl Harbor on 16 May following 
Fleet Problem VIII’s conclusion. 15  
A month later, in June 1928, the Lexington reached Hawaii, took on board part of 
the Langley’s air group, and made a high-speed run to the West Coast with Reeves 
aboard. While significant for being the first operations for the new carriers, the drills 
conducted during this brief cruise back to California could only hint at the capabilities of 
the Lexington and Saratoga. The addition of the new carriers to the fleet would allow 
much wider experimentation with cooperation of aircraft and naval vessels and Fleet 
Problems IX through XIV would provide the opportunity to showcase the abilities of 
large fleet carriers.                          
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CHAPTER IV 
 “WE HAVE GONE FAR, YET WE HAVE FAR TO GO”1: FLEET PROBLEM IX 
 Fleet Problem IX has become a benchmark for those discussing the development 
of naval aviation, and, more specifically, the aircraft carrier. From the moment the 
exercise was conducted in January 1929, it received a great deal of publicity and has been 
cited by historians as evidence of the sophistication that American carrier doctrine 
achieved before the start of World War II. The intent of Fleet Problem IX was to provide 
the military with ideas as to how to defend the Panama Canal from a concerted naval and 
aerial attack, as well as to provide the fleet with operational experience in areas like 
scouting and convoy escort. Though these goals were reached, the exercise’s major 
contribution was to demonstrate the potential of independent carrier air strikes. The 
exercise would also become fodder for numerous mainstream press articles and cited to 
gain larger appropriations for naval construction. 2  
However, a closer examination of the exercise reveals that for all the promise that 
carrier aviation showed during the exercise, there still remained major problems that had 
to be overcome for the carrier to become a viable weapon system. The most important of 
these problems were the technical limitations of early carrier aircraft and determining the 
proper number and composition of a carrier’s escort vessels during combat operations. 
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There is also some justification for the navy’s reluctance to label the exercise, as well as 
the two new aircraft carriers, as an unqualified success. The conservatism of the navy can 
perhaps be best expressed by the closing sentence of Commander- in-Chief, United States 
Fleet (CinCUS) Admiral Harold Wiley’s comments in the final report on Fleet Problem 
IX, in which he stated, “While aviation has found its place in the fleet, and the 
importance of its role remained unquestioned, there is no analysis of Fleet Problem IX 
fairly made which fails to point to the battleship as the final arbiter of naval destiny.”3 
Fleet Problem IX’s scenario, which was an attack upon the Panama Canal, was 
definitely not new to the Navy. In May 1913, even before completion of the canal, the 
Joint Army-Navy Board recommended that exercises be held to determine the best means 
of defending the waterway. Fleet Problems I and III had both dealt with scenarios 
involving a seaborne attack upon canal installations. Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves, the 
commander of the air forces for the Black Fleet, had participated in two previous 
simulated attacks upon the canal. While the seacoast could be defended in part by the 
extensive coastal fortifications erected during the 1920s, aerial defense was another 
matter. There were extensive debates in the military as to the best locations to place the 
various air installations in the Canal Zone, with the ability of aircraft stationed at them to 
react quickly to an attack being one criterion. The difficulties of aerial defense of the 
canal were realized at least as early as 1920 when Captain George C. Day, the 
commanding officer of the USS Pennsylvania, wrote a letter to Captain Thomas Craven, 
who was the Director of Naval Aviation. In his letter, Captain Day stated that he expected 
a combatant at the outset of hostilities to “… raid by fast surface craft or by air plane 
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carriers with the object of temporarily disabling the canal and thereby dividing our naval 
force.”4 
Both the Lexington and the Saratoga had joined the fleet in the spring of 1928. 
Thus, in Fleet Problem IX, for the first time, both the attacking and defending fleets could 
include aircraft carriers. During the initial planning for the exercise, it was intended for 
the Langley to participate in the exercise with its new brethren. However, excessive 
delays in completing its scheduled overhaul prevented the ship from participating, and 
the seaplane tender Aroostook took its place. 
In Fleet Problem IX the Battle Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral William V. 
Pratt, took the role of Black. Pratt’s forces included three battleship divisions, three 
destroyer divisions, two destroyer squadrons, several submarines, various vessels of the 
fleet train, and a squadron of minesweepers. Most importantly, Saratoga and the tender 
Aroostook serving as a substitute for the Langley remained under Pratt’s control. In 
addition to these vessels, the Black Fleet included 116 aircraft carried aboard Saratoga, 
Aroostook, and the various surface vessels that carried floatplanes. Additionally, in order 
to make up for the Langley’s absence, its entire complement of aircraft was transferred to 
the Saratoga in order to allow the pilots to still receive the necessary training and 
experience, thus further bolstering the carrier’s complement up to 87 aircraft.5  
                                                 
4 Senior Member, Joint Board to the Secretary of War, 6 May 1913, Records of the Joint Board, 
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The Blue Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Montgomery M. Taylor, was 
composed largely of the Scouting Fleet plus the Lexington and several local units, 
including land-based aviation squadrons and minesweepers. Between the normal 
complement of 63 aircraft normally carried by the Lexington, as well as the various 
floatplanes and land-based aircraft, Taylor’s forces possessed a total of 145 aircraft.6 
During the preparatory work for the exercise, Reeves submitted a plan calling for 
the Saratoga, along with its attending escort vessels, to make a wide detour far to the 
south before launching its air squadrons. Reeves believed that such a detour would give 
his forces the element of surprise and to greatly reduce the chances of detection by Blue’s 
scouts. However, the plans submitted to Pratt made no mention whatsoever of this 
proposed maneuver. Reeves presented this plan to Pratt just before the Black Fleet left 
port, and Pratt immediately adopted it.7  
He put Reeves’ plan into effect on 22 January, some three days before the official 
start of the exercise. At this point the Saratoga, escorted by the light cruiser Omaha, 
separated from the rest of the Striking Force and began a high speed run to the south. 
After launching air strikes against on the canal locks, the two ships intended to 
rendezvous with the rest of the Black Fleet Striking Force on 26 January so that they 
could provide that squadron with protection from possible attack by Blue Fleet aircraft 
and battleships. While the Saratoga swung southward in an arc, the remainder of the  
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Black Fleet continued on course towards Panama.8  
The third and final portion of Pratt’s forces, the Support Fleet, contained 
Battleship Division Four, as well as the Aroostook and the fleet’s replenishment vessels. 
A position far to the west of the Striking Force on 26 January was the designated 
launching point for the Aroostook’s own aerial attack upon the canal locks, with the 
Aroostook’s single seaplane being tasked with the destruction of the Atlantic-side locks 
of the canal. In an element that greatly enhanced the element of surprise for the 
Aroostook’s attack, Blue forces were never properly notified that the tender was to act as 
a substitute for the Langley, and that its single seaplane represented the 24 aircraft the 
Langley normally carried. To further enhance the chances of a successful mission, the 
Aroostook was not held to the same safety standards that led the Saratoga to launch its air 
strikes upon the canal locks much closer inshore. In fact, the Aroostook’s seaplane 
launched from a point over 150 miles from the coast with the intention that the seaplane 
was conducting a one-way mission.  
By the time the exercise officially started, at 0001 hours on 25 January, the Black 
Fleet was already well dispersed with its ships proceeding to the locations from which 
they were to launch their designated attacks. Later that day, the Saratoga, having 
detoured as far south as the Galapagos Islands, finally changed its course and began a 
speed run to the north in preparation for the next day’s attack. Reeves’ daring run to the 
south, despite its brilliance, had been at least partially anticipated by the Blue Fleet. 
Admiral Taylor sent out two groups of destroyers, one to scout the western sea 
approaches to Panama, and the other group to scout the southern approaches, including 
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the direction from which Saratoga would advance upon the Canal Zone. One of these 
southern scouts, the destroyer Breck, made the first contact with the Saratoga at 1613 on 
25 January. Rather strangely, the Breck seems to have believed that the carrier it had 
found was the Lexington, and not the Saratoga. Thus, according to Captain Eugene E. 
Wilson, Reeves’ chief of staff, the Saratoga signaled the Breck to take station astern of it, 
whereupon the Saratoga opened fire on the destroyer and the umpire ruled that the 
destroyer had been sunk.9  
With this ruling, the Breck became a non-factor for the remainder of the exercise, 
though it had managed to send off a message of its findings that the Blue light cruiser 
Detroit intercepted. At 1810 and 1922, the Detroit exchanged shots with the Saratoga 
and its escort, and found itself in the rare situation of engaging in a surface duel with an 
aircraft carrier that possessing larger artillery than its own. Though the Detroit came to 
share the same fate as the Breck and ruled sunk, it continued shadowing the Saratoga and 
reported the carrier’s position to the rest of Blue Fleet. Though the Saratoga’s detour was 
no longer a surprise, the fact that only a destroyer and a light cruiser had found it by this 
point could still be considered a success. To their credit, Reeves and Wilson correctly 
assumed that the ship they feared most in the Blue Fleet, the Lexington, would not guard 
the southern approaches itself. No appreciable Blue force lay between the Saratoga and  
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the launching point.10   
While the Saratoga survived the first day of the exercise, the Lexington was not 
so lucky. Though not in a position to intercept the Saratoga, the Lexington was itself far 
south of the canal by the afternoon of the 25th. An error on the part of other Blue vessels 
shadowing the battleships of Black’s striking force allowed the captain of the Lexington 
to believe that Black’s battleships were 17 miles more distant than was actually the case. 
Thus, the Lexington received quite a shock when it emerged from a squall at 1218 within 
the firing ranges of Black’s battleships. The carrier’s scouts had not deployed, and by the 
time the enemy battleships were sighted, it was far too late for the carrier to use its 12-
knot speed advantage over the battleships to flee the scene. The umpire ruled the 
Lexington sunk though, in order to allow the ship to continue to participate and allow its 
crew to gain valuable operational experience, the only penalty assessed was a reduction 
of its top speed to 18 knots. Most importantly, the umpire’s penalty allowed it to continue 
conducting flight operations.11   
Before dawn on the 26th, the Saratoga finally reached its designated launching 
point, and at 0430 its aircraft began to fill the skies. By 0458, the Saratoga completed 
launching its strike force of 83 aircraft, which was the largest single air strike launched 
from a single carrier deck in history up to that time. What Reeves knew was that a race 
was on: the Saratoga’s aircraft had to be in the sky and proceeding towards an attack 
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upon the canal before the Saratoga could be attacked or the fighter defenses of the Canal 
locks could react. The objectives of the attacks were the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel 
locks on the Pacific side of the canal. The Blue commander made the task of Saratoga’s 
planes much easier since he had not sent out aerial patrols. The four groups of planes that 
Saratoga launched were judged to have succeeded in their mission and both sets of locks 
targeted were ruled destroyed.12  
Though the raid succeeded, the Saratoga itself suffered a trying morning. At 
0625, the carrier spotted three battleships that its captain believed to be part of the Black 
battleship force that Saratoga planned to rendezvous with that morning. Instead, they 
were battleships from the Blue Fleet that promptly opened fire on the carrier. 
Navigational errors on the part of Black Fleet’s battleships prevented them from 
rendezvousing with the Saratoga, leaving the carrier exposed to surface attack. The Blue 
battleships sank the Saratoga, but as in the case of the Lexington, the umpires allowed the 
carrier to continue participating in the exercise without serious penalty. Later that 
morning, at 0740, a group of aircraft from the Lexington located and attacked the 
Saratoga. Given that the Saratoga had no fighter patrol aloft at the time of the attack, and 
it was just beginning to recover its air group, it was ruled that it would have been at least 
badly damaged by the attack. Reeves argued that the last attack and subsequent “damage” 
to the Saratoga would not have occurred in wartime. “Had it been a real action, of course 
I could have used the Saratoga’s superior speed to run away and avoid action, simply 
paying the price of planes and pilots for the serious damage to the canal locks such a raid 
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must inflict,” he explained, but it was a training exercise in which according maximum 
safety for the aircraft involved led the Saratoga to remain in the best position to recover 
them irregardless of the danger to the ship itself.13 
Nearly simultaneous with the Saratoga’s attack, the Aroostook’s seaplane 
lumbered into the sky for its own raid. No real attempt was made to stop the seaplane’s 
attack on the Gatun locks on the Atlantic-end of the canal, and after an attack judged as 
successful, the seaplane landed, as per orders, at the Army airstrip at Coco Solo. Though 
miscommunication between the Blue Force Commander and his subordinates contributed 
to the surprise of the attack, as well as the unthreatening appearance of a single naval 
floatplane, this attack could be interpreted to be a demonstration of the value that a 
surprise carrier raid could have upon the enemy.  However, much like the Saratoga, the 
Aroostook encountered difficulties with Blue surface vessels. When the ship left the 
remainder of the Support Force to search for a floatplane missing from the battleship 
Idaho, it was sunk at 1722 on the 26th by the light cruiser Marblehead.14  
Later that day, the status of all vessels was restored to full working order so that 
the two fleets could proceed to the next phase of the exercise, which was for a general 
engagement. The two forces participated in a brief truce for rest during the afternoon, in 
which at times vessels from the two forces often traveled together.  
The engagement of 27 January started before dawn as battleships from both sides 
began dueling at long ranges. The Black Fleet gradually gained the upper hand in the 
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battle as its ships possessed longer-ranged weapons than those of the Blue Fleet. During 
the day, the Saratoga’s role diminished to a support role for the battleship operations, 
though it fought several air attacks launched against it, some of them by army planes 
from the bases ashore. Despite the length and severity of the engagements during this 
day, nothing as groundbreaking as the previous day’s operations occurred, though some 
lessons were learned. Air attacks upon the Saratoga by the Lexington’s air group merely 
reinforced the difficulties in stopping concerted air attacks, and proved to harbingers of 
the next two Fleet Problems.  
A great deal of media coverage was devoted to the exercise, which concluded on 
28 January. Most was positive, though it is difficult to assess the impact that coverage 
had on public or congressional opinion. The New York Times assigned a special 
correspondent, Lewis Freeman, to cover the exercise, and he published several stories 
about it. As some measure of the quality of Freeman’s coverage, the Secretary of the 
Navy described it as “unusually accurate.” A 1930 Times article speculated about the 
future of the battleship, and used information about several naval exercises, including 
Fleet Problem IX, and statements from Eugene Wilson, who had since retired from the 
navy, as the basis for such claims. Despite the enthusiasm over the exploits of the 
carriers, it was stated that, “… the battleship is not obsolete so long as the enemy is 
building battleships, for the aircraft adherents do not claim they can put the dreadnought 
out of action.”15 
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The media attention attracted by Fleet Problem IX fit well into Admiral Moffett’s 
constant efforts to keep naval aviation in the limelight. Among these public relations 
ventures were attempts to break speed records by naval aircraft, as well as promotional 
visits to major cities by various units, including carriers and airships, throughout the 
1920s.16 The publicity given these activities was useful to Admiral Moffett in his 
personal political struggles against foes and in his campaign to secure appropriations for 
naval aviation from Congress. Throughout much of early 1929, Moffett also waged a 
battle to secure re-appointment under the incoming Hoover administration. The campaign 
ultimately proved successful, and the Hoover administration retained Moffett’s services. 
Fleet Problem IX also attracted a great deal of attention within naval circles. The 
Naval Institute’s Proceedings published portions of Freeman’s articles from the New 
York Times, as well as some original articles, many of which focused upon the actions of 
the Saratoga. An article by Admiral Reeves entitled “Aviation in the Fleet” described the 
roles played by aircraft. Though Reeves briefly outlined the spotting and scouting 
performed by carrier aircraft, he focused mostly upon the offensive roles for carriers, 
using the Saratoga’s strike on the canal to demonstrate this ability. Rather than 
supplanting battleship artillery, Reeves advocated a more complementary relationship 
between carrier air power and battleships. Reeves concluded the article by stating that: 
Our efforts in the past have been crowned with a certain amount of success, but 
every success has only indicated new possibilities of the employment of aircraft in 
fleet operations and has emphasized the vital importance of continuous operating 
with the fleet the maximum number of aircraft that can be carried on our surface 
vessels.17 
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In another article, “Some Aspects of Carrier and Cruiser Design,” Lieutenant 
Commander Forrest Sherman, a future Chief of Naval Operations, also advocated an 
offensive role for carrier air power.  Sherman, much like Reeves, believed that an aircraft 
carrier required several escorting vessels for its protection. He also believed that 
delivering air attacks upon the main body of the enemy fleet was an important function 
for carriers, stating that, “The Saratoga and Lexington with their high sustained speed, 
heavy batteries, and enormous airplane capacity are well suited to this employment.”  
Sherman also anticipated the later cleavages in American carrier designs by calling for 
“air force,” “battle line,” and “scouting” carriers, plus what he called “carrier cruisers,” a 
type of vessel that mated a carrier deck with a heavy cruiser hull. Such ships would be 
armed with several 8- inch guns, but would only carry 30 to 40 aircraft. Sherman’s 
descriptions place the Lexington and Saratoga as the air force carriers, which were to be 
the largest and more capable ships, while the design he advocates as a battle line carrier 
fits the Ranger.18  
Given the fact that all three carriers that participated in the exercise were ruled 
sunk, with the Saratoga receiving this judgment multiple times, it is not hard to see why 
some in the Navy were unwilling to believe that carriers would supplant battleships as the 
Navy’s preeminent capital ship. What the exercise demonstrated to Reeves was that 
carriers required a cruiser and destroyer screen for proper defense from air and surface 
threats. That the threat of surface attack had to be countered by escort vessels rather than 
by the carrier’s own weapons was made clear when it was discovered that the recoil 
                                                 
18 Lieutenant Commander Forrest Sherman, “Some Aspects of Carrier Design.” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, 56 (Nov. 1930), 998; Ibid.,  1002; Ibid., 999. 
 46 
caused by firing the carrier’s main battery of eight- inch guns could seriously damage 
aircraft on the flight and hanger decks. It is not clear whether the potential for such 
damage was realized during Fleet Problem IX, but a 1935 proposal to remove the guns 
was based, in part, on a desire to avoid potential damage to aircraft by those guns.19    
It was also clear that a carrier’s air group could not provide adequate defense 
because, while the ordnance carried by those aircraft could destroy other carriers and 
lighter vessels, they could not inflict serious damage on more heavily armored cruisers 
and battleships. Air launched torpedoes might provide a way to attack the more thinly 
armored portions of battleships, but the torpedo bomber of the day, the T4M, was a very 
slow aircraft, and torpedoes air-dropped by the T4M were quite fragile. The inability of 
carrier aircraft to carry heavy bombs to attack capital ships, combined with the relatively 
short range of these aircraft, meant that much of the promise that carriers held was still 
just that: promise.20  
Though skepticism of carrier air power remained following Fleet Problem IX, the 
exercise taught the navy many lessons, not the least of which was the value of the greater 
integration of carriers into the fleet as a whole. Much of this can be attributed to the fact 
that the Lexington and Saratoga had the capability, in terms of size, aircraft complement, 
and speed to make a contribution to the fleet that the valuable, but smaller and slower, 
Langley had previously been unable to provide. The Saratoga’s greater capability 
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allowed it to execute the kind of independent attack that would become a hallmark of 
World War II carrier tactics.  
 Fleet Problem IX also influenced the design of the next class of aircraft carriers. 
Before the conduct of Fleet Problem IX many naval officers believed that the Lexington 
and Saratoga were too large to function efficiently. The design process for what would 
become the U.S. Navy’s next carrier, the USS Ranger was already well underway and the 
belief that smaller carriers possessed more utility held sway in its design. The Ranger 
was well under 100 feet shorter than its immediate predecessors, with a nominal 
displacement of 16,578 tons. More importantly, its maximum complement of aircraft was 
25 percent smaller than that which could be carried on the Lexington and Saratoga, 
though in actual practice the Ranger often carried as many aircraft as its predecessors. 
The Ranger’s top speed, which was highly critical in the days before the advent of 
effective catapults, was only 29.5 knots. The slower top speed meant longer takeoff runs 
for aircraft, as well as increased difficulty maintaining formation with the fleet when the 
carrier needed to launch aircraft. The low top speed of the Ranger, in combination with 
its limited aircraft complement, would relegate it to operations in European waters during 
World War II, and it was destined never to serve alongside the large fleet carriers that 
succeeded it in the Pacific Theater. 
Although the strikes by the Saratoga on the canal would have been far more 
difficult for the Ranger to carry out, the recommendations contained in the CinCUS 
report after Fleet Problem IX called for the continued building of smaller carriers. The 
inability of the two large carriers to evade destruction during Fleet Problem IX posed a 
problem for the Navy because the two ships represented the lion’s share of American 
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carrier aviation. In early 1929, the desirability of having the air force spread across 
multiple vessels outweighed the increased offensive capability that could be gained by 
combining aircraft on larger, but fewer, carriers. This opinion would change over the next 
two years.21 
 There were other lessons drawn from the experiences of Fleet Problem IX.  
The difficulties experienced by Saratoga and Lexington in handling aircraft led Captain 
John Halligan, the Saratoga’s commanding officer, to suggest to Reeves that a third 
elevator should be added to the two already called for in the design of Ranger. This 
would “expedite” the positioning of aircraft during flight operations, and the requested 
change was eventually incorporated into the Ranger’s design.22   
Fleet Problem IX also influenced the composition of a carrier’s escort vessels. 
Reeves found the Omaha to be inadequate as a carrier escort, because a foul keel limited 
the cruiser’s speed to 25 knots making it impossible for it to keep pace with the Saratoga, 
which had a top speed of 33 knots. Reeves also advanced the idea that the best formation 
for a carrier would be amid a screen of cruisers and destroyers, thus providing the carrier 
with a means of defense from surface and submarine attack during combat situations and 
allowing for carrier operations independent of most of the fleet. Pratt supported this 
suggestion, and included it in his own remarks on the exercise in the CinCUS’s report. In 
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the following exercises, this suggestion by Reeves was taken seriously, thus leading to 
the birth of carrier task forces.23  
 One potential hurdle of carrier escorting duties, namely the limited the fuel 
capacities of potential escorting vessels, was rectified following Fleet Problem IX. The 
shortcomings of the Omaha and the inability of the destroyers to keep pace with the 
Saratoga during its end-around had highlighted the need for improved refueling 
capabilities. Admiral Pratt recommended that the Lexington and Saratoga undergo 
modifications so that they could take advantage of the high capacity of the carrier’s 
bunkers and refuel their escorts at sea. Apparently this modification was carried out in the 
latter half of 1930, too late for Fleet Problems X and XI, but the change would be quite 
useful during Fleet Problem XII and beyond.24  
 Following Fleet Problem IX, Moffett and Captain John Towers cited the success 
of carriers in Fleet Problem IX in testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee 
to persuade Congress to authorize the funding for the desired five carriers of the Ranger-
class being requested. This appropriation was a part of the so-called “cruiser bill” that 
called for the construction of 25 cruisers and 5 aircraft carriers. However, Congress had 
whittled the requests down considerably to 15 cruisers and a single carrier. When Senator 
Hiram Bingham attempted to add funding for an additional two carriers to the bill, he 
cited the sinking of the Lexington to justify the additional appropriation, arguing that the 
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aircraft of the fleet needed to be dispersed among more ships to lessen the impact of the 
loss of one or two carriers. In support of his argument, Bingham cited a one-year old 
statement from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Charles F. Hughes, in which 
Hughes stated, “Aircraft carriers are becoming each year more necessary for fleet 
efficiency. Our present effective strength consists of only two units, the Saratoga and 
Lexington, and the loss of one of these units would reduce our carrier force by 50 
percent.” Despite the simple truth behind Hughes’ statement, Senator Bingham’s efforts 
ultimately met with failure. The Ranger itself was built, but no additional units of the 
class ever received funding. 25  
The 15 cruisers provided for in the legislation, which became two Portland-class 
heavy cruisers, seven New Orleans-class heavy cruisers, five Brooklyn-class light 
cruisers, and the heavy cruiser Wichita, comprised the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s 
cruiser fleet at the start of World War II, and provided escort for early US carrier 
operations in the Pacific. Due to the complaints leveled by the participants of Fleet 
Problem IX concerning the dearth of cruisers in the navy, the so called “cruiser bill” 
measure helped make up that shortfall. Valuable as the cruisers provided for in 1929 
might eventually prove to be, Navy officials did not consider them to be adequate in 
number.  The need for additional cruisers highlighted by Fleet Problem IX was reflected 
in the contents of a General Board document concerning the 1931 Building Program:  
Every war game, whether played at the War College or carried out in practice on 
the high seas, and a study of our extensive trade routes, emphasizes the need for 
an increased number of vessels of the cruiser type. The number called for is the 
result of the conclusions of the CINC afloat and the GB, as representing the 
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country’s needs and is based upon the experiences of war and annual post-war 
combined fleet war games and maneuvers.26   
 
 FP IX had less impact on the defense of the Panama Canal, which was the main 
focus of the operation. No changes were made with regard to coastal artillery, but anti-
aircraft defense did improve. During Fleet Problem IX fire from anti-aircraft batteries had   
failed to defend the canal locks, but these must have been improved significantly because 
the anti-aircraft defenses were judged as having successfully defended canal installations 
in local exercises in 1933, save for the areas around Gatun. Following the 1933 exercises, 
plans were laid for the installation of torpedo nets to protect the Gatun Spillway and 
Gatun Locks in 1934. A shortage of materials with which to construct the nets allowed 
for a more thorough analysis of the nets, resulting in the conclusion that the nets proposed 
for the locks would be ineffective because an aircraft could still drop a torpedo between 
the net and the locks, though the ones planned to protect the spillway were judged 
adequate and thus installed. It would appear that serious efforts to bolster other canal 
defenses were not revived until 1939.27 
 The lack of action concerning defense of the Panama Canal may be traced to the 
problems of inter-service rivalry and, thus, with regard to its main focus, Fleet Problem 
IX may be judged a failure. On the other hand, it proved to be of greater benefit to the 
Navy. Though the outcome of Fleet Problem IX, at least for the carriers, was mixed, there 
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were several positive effects on naval aviation. Beginning with this exercise, the two new 
carriers began to occupy a regular place in the Fleet Problems, and undertook remarkably 
prescient operations during these exercises. Admiral Pratt seems to have come away from 
the Problem with a stronger faith in air power, and though this faith would be tested in 
later problems, the Lexington and Saratoga were often the centerpieces of the operational 
units of fleets participating in the Fleet Problems during Pratt’s term as Chief of Naval 
Operations. While some officers of the Navy, especially members of the so-called “Gun 
Club” of surface warfare officers, remained skeptical about the role to be played by 
aviation, Fleet Problem IX did succeed in raising the status of naval aviation through 
much positive publicity. The navy still committed itself in the immediate aftermath of 
Fleet Problem IX to the smaller Ranger design for future carriers, but, fortunately, only 
one such ship was ever built. As the technology matured, particularly for aircraft, it 
allowed some of the doctrinal lessons learned in Fleet Problem IX and other exercises to 
be employed in future carrier operations, particularly Grand Joint Exercise 4 and Fleet 
Problem XIV.  
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CHAPTER V 
CARRIERS IN A FLEET ACTION: FLEET PROBLEMS X AND XI 
 Following Fleet Problem IX, the two new carriers, Lexington and Saratoga, 
became fixtures in the next several exercises. Not until Fleet Problem XVI would the 
participation of another carrier, the Ranger, allow for a wider base of experimentation in 
carrier operations. Yet, despite only having the two fleet carriers and the obsolescent 
Langley with which to operate, the Fleet Problems still demonstrated an interest by the 
Navy in assessing the capabilities and best uses of carrier air power. The missions 
assigned to the carriers in Fleet Problems X and XI allowed for a greater degree of 
independence for the carriers than had previously been seen in the Fleet Problems, but 
was in many ways only an outgrowth of the role previously filled solely by the Langley. 
Though surface fleet engagements similar to those seen in earlier problems dominated the 
1930 exercises, the presence of the new carriers affected the outcome of Fleet Problems 
X and XI. 
 In 1930, for the only time other than 1924, two fleet problems were held during 
the same year. The first, Fleet Problem X, was staged in the western portions of the 
Caribbean Sea. In its scenario a Black coalition of nations had allied with South 
American nations and islands in the southern Caribbean in a war against the United States 
and its allies in Central America and the northeastern Caribbean. Losses in the conflict 
had reduced the naval strengths of the two combatants to roughly equivalent levels. The 
Blue fleet represented American naval forces in the Pacific, which had heretofore been 
unable to reinforce the battered units in the Atlantic. In order to simulate this in the 
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exercise, the Blue fleet was to begin the exercise from Colon on Panama’s 
eastern/northern coast.1  
 The mission for the Blue fleet, under the command of Admiral Louis Nulton, was 
to restore American naval supremacy in the Caribbean by eliminating the Black forces in 
the region, while Vice Admiral William C. Cole’s Black fleet was to prevent this from 
taking place. The distribution of carriers in the exercise was similar to that attempted 
during Fleet Problem IX with Blue receiving the Saratoga and the Langley, and Black the 
Lexington.2  
Neither force commander made carriers the focus of offensive efforts during the 
planning phases, but both recognized, as had been prophesied in many board maneuvers 
at the Naval War College, that control of the air was vital for fleet success since the victor 
could launch airstrikes at will upon the enemy and allow for unimpeded aerial spotting of 
the battleships’ artillery fire. The orders written by Admiral Nulton for the “Air Force,” 
as the Saratoga and Langley were called for the exercise, were quite succinct: “When 
Lexington is located attack Lexington.” While Cole’s orders were not nearly so blunt, the 
Lexington’s primary task was to locate the Langley and Saratoga.3 
The key difference between the two fleets was in the placement of their carriers. 
The Saratoga and Langley steamed as a part of Blue’s Main Body, which comprised 
most Blue vessels, save for submarines and auxiliaries. On the other hand, the Lexington 
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scouted ahead of Black’s main body for most of the exercise as part of the Carrier Group, 
which also included several destroyers. The positioning of the carriers in the exercise 
would be the difference between success and failure for the opposing fleets.4 
On the eve of the exercise, a change was made to the airgroups participating in the 
problem. By mutual decision of fleet commanders on both sides, the torpedo planes were 
not allowed to participate due to their unreliable engines. The absence of the torpedo 
planes meant that the carriers were unable to launch any effective strikes against 
opposing capital ships, carriers excluded. The Martin T4M torpedo bomber remained in 
service despite the Navy’s dissatisfaction with the aircraft, and its successors, the Great 
Lakes TG-1(1928) and TG-2(1930) included only slight modifications from the original 
T4M. Continued problems with all three models, when combined with the poor technical 
state of American aerial dropped torpedoes in the early 1930s, meant that the carriers 
would rarely have the means to successfully attack battleships in the other problems in 
the early 1930s. Even the bomber and fighter aircraft in use during the period were much 
closer in capability to World War I aircraft than to those of early World War II. When the 
technical limits of the aircraft combined with the artificial limits imposed by the navy to 
reduce the safety risk during exercises, the aircraft were woefully inadequate for 
accomplishing the missions required of them.5 
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Fleet Problem X began at noon on 10 March 1930 with Blue units preparing to 
leave Colon and Black units just to the north of Hispaniola. As the Blue fleet sailed to the 
northeast at about 13 knots, poor weather prevented the Saratoga and Langley from 
launching scout planes. The same weather conditions also hampered scouting operations 
from the Lexington as it steamed ahead of the Black main body with several destroyers in 
an attempt to find the Blue fleet. The poor weather continued into the next day, and while 
the aircraft on the Blue carriers were still prevented from flying, four groups of scouts 
launched from the Lexington because Black commanders deemed the weather risks 
manageable. The Lexington’s scouts failed to locate the Blue fleet in the course of their 
search. The courses of the Black scouting group and the Blue main body nearly brought 
the two fleets into contact, but, due to the poor weather and inability to scout effectively, 
the opposing fleets reversed course because both commanders had no information on 
what lay ahead of their fleets.6  
On 12 March, the improving weather allowed the Saratoga and Langley to finally 
launch scout planes, 68 total, as the Blue fleet resumed its northeasterly course. The 
aircraft failed to located any “enemy” warships, but a light cruiser, the Memphis, reported 
sighting the Lexington. A futile chase ensued, for the Lexington was actually 120 miles 
away engaging in its own scouting operations. Unlike the previous two days the 
Lexington held its position rather than advancing, thus preventing an encounter from 
developing between the Blue and Black fleets. Further scouting operations from both 
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fleets on 13 March also failed to produce any meaningful contact between the two 
forces.7 
Finally, contact was made on Friday, 14 March. During the night, the Lexington 
rendezvoused with the Black main body, taking a position well to the east of the 
battleships, while the Langley and Saratoga lay in between the main bodies of both fleets.  
All three carriers launched scout planes at dawn, but the Blue fleet scouts returned to the 
carriers due to poor weather conditions. The same conditions did not hamper the 
Lexington’s scouts, who made a dive-bombing attack upon the Saratoga at 0815, 
rendering its forward flight deck inoperable. About 15 minutes later, 40 more aircraft 
from the Lexington attacked the Saratoga, Langley, and a Blue light cruiser, destroying 
the flight decks of both carriers and sinking the cruiser. Black cruisers engaged the 
Langley soon after the air attacks, and though the carrier was not sunk, it was judged by 
the umpires to be so severely damaged as to render it virtually useless for the remainder 
of the exercise. Other air attacks from the Lexington made at about the same time as those 
upon the carriers focused upon the Blue battle line, damaging several battleships. Thus, 
the first meaningful contacts between the opposing air forces ended with a resounding 
victory for Black, which gained total air superiority over Blue in a less than an hour.8  
As the morning progressed, aircraft from the Lexington continued to attack Blue 
cruisers, but the exercise became largely a surface duel between the opposing battleship 
forces later dubbed by the New York Times as the “Battle of Navassa.” Black, having 
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gained air superiority for its spotter planes, initially had the advantage over Blue, but the 
final tallies showed that Black’s battle line was only slightly less damaged than Blue’s.9  
In the critique after the exercise, one suggestion later put to use was to segregate 
the fleet’s airgroup, with one carrier having all the fighters and scouts, and the other 
carrier deploying the bombers and torpedo planes. This suggestion would later be tested 
during Grand Joint Exercise 4 in 1932.10 
A major issue in the critique that followed Fleet Problem X involved carrier 
vulnerability. The Commander, Aircraft Squadrons for Black, Rear Admiral Henry V. 
Butler, noted that, “Opposing carriers within a strategical area are like blindfolded men 
armed with daggers in a ring. There is apt to be sudden destruction to one or both. If the 
bandage over the eyes is removed the other is doomed.” While future critiques of carrier 
vulnerability were not described as dramatically, the fact remained that carrier 
vulnerability to air attack, first seen in Problem IX, had no easy solution in the early 
1930s. The most common U.S. Navy attempt to deal with the issue, as seen in Fleet 
Problem X as well as many later exercises, revolved around aggressive operations to 
locate and disable enemy carriers by attacking first. Only with the advent of radar and 
fighter control techniques in the early part of World War II could a carrier’s aircraft 
reliably defend the ship from air attack. Until then, the vulnerability of the carrier was  
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taken as a given. 11  
One remedy to carrier vulnerability was to allow carriers and their escorts to 
steam independently of the rest of the fleet. Black had allowed its carriers such freedom 
by including the Lexington in what Admiral Pratt, now the Commander- in-Chief, U.S. 
Fleet, termed an “offensive scouting” force. He further elaborated that, “A fast group, 
composed as this one was [of a carrier and a screen of destroyers], has all the elements 
for conducting a wide search; speed, if necessary, to retire before superior strength; and 
the weapons [presumably by means of air attack] to inflict a very severe blow on any 
suitable objectives found – enemy carriers or battleships.” In an apparent nod to Reeves’ 
end-run with the Saratoga the previous year, Pratt said that, “The aggressive use of 
aircraft to gain superiority over the enemy prior to the main engagement appears sound, 
provided one’s own security is not entirely neglected. Aircraft carriers engaged in such 
operations are less likely to be located by the enemy than if they are tied to a cruising 
disposition with a more or less passive task of awaiting to defend the fleet when it is 
attacked.”12 
Following Fleet Problem X, the participating nava l units dispersed throughout 
numerous Caribbean ports to prepare for Fleet Problem XI. The scenario for the second 
exercise called for a simulated fleet mobilization from a peacetime state of readiness. The 
force compositions resembled those in Fleet Problem X, only this time the roles were 
reversed. For Problem XI, Vice Admiral Cole commanded the Blue Fleet, with the 
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Lexington again under his command, while Vice Admiral Lucious Bostwick commanded 
the Black Fleet, which included the Saratoga and Langley.13 
For the problem, which was again set during a war that had already been under 
way for several months, the larger islands in the central Caribbean and the various 
Central American countries were to be allied with Blue, with South American countries 
and islands in the southern Caribbean allied with Black. Additionally, the Black fleet was 
presumed to have already established an advanced base in Trinidad. To further 
complicate the problem, the scenario stated that an armistice had been in effect for the 
two weeks prior to the start of the problem, and that this armistice had led to the dispersal 
of naval units in several Caribbean ports, with the Lexington at St. Thomas in the Virgin 
Islands. The Black carrier Saratoga began the problem in Barbados and the Langley at 
Trinidad.14  
Both fleets sortied from their ports at the designated starting time at 0800 on 14 
April and steamed for Jamaica because both fleet commanders believed it a key location 
to exercise control over the Caribbean. The Blue fleet sailed westward along the northern 
coast of Hispaniola, while the ships of the Black fleet sailed to the west from their bases 
in the southern Caribbean. As the two forces continued heading for Jamaica into the 
second day, the Saratoga intercepted radio bearings thought to originate from the 
Lexington, though the carriers were too far apart for their planes to reach each other. 
Later that day, following radio transmissions in the clear to find missing scout planes, the 
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Saratoga detached from the scouting line and head south to evade possible detection by 
Blue forces.15  
On the night of 15 April, the Lexington became the centerpiece of the Carrier 
Group, which also contained four cruisers and four destroyers, which was ordered to 
conduct scouting operations towards the southeast ahead of the main body of the Black 
fleet. Meanwhile, the Saratoga, which had rejoined the Blue fleet during the night, 
resumed its position just behind the scouting line of light cruisers ahead of the Black 
fleet. The scouting operations on 16 April from both carriers were unsuccessful, with one 
group of scouts returning to the Lexington prematurely due to rain. 16  
At 1616 on April 16, the Detroit, one of the light cruisers accompanying the 
Lexington, reported a contact with a Black cruiser, which turned out to be the Raleigh, 
one of the Saratoga’s escorts. Poor visibility led to a confused engagement primarily 
among the scouting line cruisers in which several vessels never made contact with the 
enemy. The poor visibility also meant that the aircraft on the two carriers played no part 
in the battle, which remained largely a gunnery duel between the light cruisers. At the 
end of the engagement umpires ruled that a cruiser in each fleet had been destroyed.17  
Following the battle, both carriers retired from the area, with the Richmond 
attempting a fruitless pursuit of the Lexington that was broken off in the darkness. For 
some idea of the importance accorded the aircraft carriers by commanders in these 
exercises, the Black destroyer Decatur passed up an ideal chance to torpedo the Blue 
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light cruiser Cincinnati during the night because its captain did not want to risk depleting 
his supply of torpedoes to the point that he would not have enough to left to attack the 
Lexington, if such an opportunity arose.18  
The following morning, 17 April, the Lexington’s position was still to the west of 
Hispaniola, with the Saratoga to the south of her. During the morning, the Lexington’s 
scout planes failed to locate the Saratoga, but they did locate two of the three Black 
submarines, sinking one. The Saratoga also launched scouts that morning, and from 
intercepted radio transmissions located the Lexington at 0655 from radio bearings. 
Following the discovery, two groups of aircraft were launched at 0800 and 0942, with the 
latter group attacking the Lexington at 1045. Encountering no opposition from the 
Lexington’s fighter patrol or anti-aircraft batteries, the scouts pressed in for the attack, but 
the ruling handed down by the observer was only a 15-minute damage penalty for the 
Lexington’s flight deck. An hour later, an entire squadron of aircraft from the Saratoga 
executed another attack upon the Lexington, this time earning credit for the destruction of 
15 aircraft and forcing a one-hour penalty upon the flight deck. Once the Chief Observer 
learned of the attack, the penalty was increased to 24 hours, but the Lexington did not 
receive word of this decision until nearly nightfall. By then its captain had launched two 
air attacks on Blue, neither of which was successful. The exercise would end before the 
Lexington could resume aerial operations, thus potentially leaving the Black fleet with air 
superiority for the remainder of the exercise.19   
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Meanwhile, the Saratoga and its cruiser companions fended off an attack by Blue 
cruisers at 1108. The two scouting lines had again made contact, but this time aircraft 
played a key role in the engagement. At 1130, Saratoga launched a group of fighters and 
scouts to join other aircraft already airborne in a strike against the Black cruisers. As a 
result of the aerial attacks, three Black cruisers were judged to have suffered damage, 
though at the cost of the Blue cruiser Trenton, which had been ruled sunk by gunfire 
during the encounter. To keep the carrier out of danger, the Saratoga withdrew to the 
south during the battle.20   
During the night of 18 April, the Saratoga, again steering northward, came under 
fire at 0430 from a group of battleships believed to be the Blue main body.  The 
battleships were actually from the Black main body, and twelve minutes elapsed before 
either party realized that the other was part of the Black fleet. The confusion that 
shrouded the incident continued for five hours before the Chief Observer learned of the 
mishap and ruled the Saratoga sunk, though at the post-exercise critique the Black Main 
Body Observer pointed out that the battleship fire on the Saratoga likely would not have 
occurred in wartime since the silhouettes of the Lexington-class carriers were quite 
distinctive from any foreign carriers in service at the time.21 
Before assessment of its damage penalty, aircraft from the Saratoga made several 
attacks on the morning of 18 April upon Blue submarines and surface forces. Operations 
from the Langley were limited to protection of spotting planes during the battleship 
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engagement.  This battle served as the climax to Fleet Problem XI, which ended in late 
morning. 22  
In the critique following Fleet Problem XI, Vice Admiral Cole and Rear Admiral 
Butler made the most insightful comments. Admiral Cole delineated some of the threats a 
carrier group, which he assumed to be comprised of one carrier, four cruisers, and two 
destroyer divisions, could fall prey to. However, if these threats proved manageable, he 
stated,  
… then possibilities lie before us in the employment of this group in distant 
operations for information; in exercising partial control of the sea before complete 
control is established, in tactical scouting, in whittling down the enemy’s strength, 
and possibly in other ways we do not now visualize. This question is of highest 
importance for study and exercise in the Fleet.23 
 
Admiral Cole’s final statement would prove prescient as future Fleet Problems, beginning 
with Problem XII, became centered on these early carrier groups. 
Admiral Butler echoed Cole’s sentiments by calling for the formation of “… 
semi-permanent task groups, each consisting of one large aircraft carrier, a division of 
cruisers, and a division of destroyers. Train them together in frequent exercises.” This 
observation aside, most of his comments related to increased efficiency of scouting 
operations by increasing the size of scouting squadrons, developing a new scout plane, 
and increasing the numbers of radios among carrier aircraft.24  
As these two exercises were being conducted, the London Naval Conference was 
underway. Most of the controversy at the conference had to do with cruiser tonnage 
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allotments among the various naval powers, though the proceedings would also affect 
carrier aviation. Before the conference, Admiral Moffett unsuccessfully proposed that the 
delegation, of which he was a member, should push to have the Lexington and Saratoga 
re-classified as experimental carriers. During the conference, a British proposal called for 
a reduction in carrier tonnage to 100,000 tons. As it turned out, Moffett successfully 
managed to keep carrier tonnage at 135,000 tons, as well as pushing through a proposal 
to devote portions of cruiser tonnage for “flying deck cruisers.” Ships of this type were to 
be frequently discussed for the next three years before the Navy shelved plans to build 
any such hybrid vessels.25 
The exercises of 1930 further integrated carrier air power into the U.S. Navy. 
While the carriers did not achieve same level of prominence they had displayed in Fleet 
Problem IX, partly because the navy allowed only scant media coverage, the 1930 
exercises succeeded at furthering the doctrinal evolution towards independent carrier task 
forces. Additionally, Admiral Moffett succeeded in his efforts to prevent any current or 
future reduction in American carrier strength. With Admiral Pratt’s accession to the post 
of Chief of Naval Operations in late 1930, the chance for carriers to assume a central 
position in the Fleet Problems would soon be at hand.     
                                                 
25 William Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation (Washington, 1994), 
213, 216-220. 
 66 
CHAPTER VI 
“MOST INTERESTING STUDY”1: FLEET PROBLEM XII 
 Of the Fleet Problems that marked the beginning of the fast carrier era for the 
U.S. Navy, perhaps the most fascinating was Fleet Problem XII. Certainly other 
Problems, such as IX, were influential and controversial for their inclusion of 
independent carrier operations, but the media and Congress saw XII as an attempt to 
solve the “carrier versus battleship” debate. Despite the hope that officers, such as 
Admiral Reeves, might have had for the carrier’s success in the exercise, the results of 
Fleet Problem XII would favor the battleships. A more careful analysis reveals that some 
naval officers realized the importance of a strong air component for the fleet’s success, 
regardless of whatever shortcomings still existed in the carriers or their aircraft, because 
of this exercise.  
 The scenario for Problem XII pitted Black, a Pacific naval power, against Blue, 
the United States, whose options were limited by the existence of Brown, a European 
nation, which might potentially favor either Black or Blue. Thus, Blue had to keep most 
of its battle fleet on the East Coast to counter any potential threat posed by Brown. 
Black’s mission was to seize or destroy the Panama Canal, as well as a theoretical canal 
in Nicaragua that was operational but was still bereft of significant defenses.  
The defending Blue Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Arthur Willard, 
included the Lexington and Saratoga, the battleship Arkansas, several cruisers and 
destroyers, the airship Los Angeles, and the seaplane tender Wright. Admiral Reeves, who 
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had missed the previous year’s exercises due to a shore assignment, commanded Carrier 
Division Two comprising the Lexington and Saratoga. The aggressor Black fleet 
commanded by Admiral Frank Schofield contained the majority of the U.S. Navy’s 
battleship strength with the Langley as Black’s sole means of air support.2  
 Recognizing that Lexington and Saratoga would be incapable of engaging Black’s 
battleship forces directly with any hope of victory, Willard decided to dispatch Reeves 
and his carriers to strike at Black’s fleet train in the hope that this would halt the Black 
advance upon the two canals. Reeves, who operated with a great deal of autonomy 
throughout the exercise, deployed his carriers in separate task forces, with himself in the 
Saratoga off the Nicaraguan coast and ordering the Lexington under Captain Ernest King 
to defend Panama. Meanwhile, Admiral Schofield had divided his Black forces into two 
parts, with the Port Culebra force designated to assault the Nicaraguan canal, and the 
Bahia Honda force to attack the Panama Canal. 3   
 Only a few hours into the problem, which began on 16 February 1931, Admiral 
Reeves ordered King and the Lexington to reconnoiter the Galapagos Islands. Apparently, 
Reeves feared that Black might launch an attack from that direction as he had during 
Fleet Problem IX. On 18 February King proceeded to the southwest as ordered and sent 
one of his escorting light cruisers, the Milwaukee, ahead of the remainder of his force to 
scout the islands using its floatplane. Having been satisfied that no enemy ships were in 
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the vicinity, the Lexington turned northward, but the carrier was now out of position to 
attack the Black Bahia Honda force until the next day. 4  
Meanwhile, far to the north, Reeves placed Saratoga behind a scouting line of 
cruisers in a formation resembling the “offensive screening” force first used by the Black 
fleet in Fleet Problem X. As Reeves’ Blue carrier division steamed westward, the Black 
Port Culebra force advanced to the northeast on Blue’s southern flank, meaning Reeves’ 
movements during these first two days of the problem took his fleet behind the advancing 
Black convoy. Once recognizing this, Admiral Reeves turned his force to the east on the 
afternoon of 18 February. 5  
At 1010 on the 19th, seaplanes from the tender Wright located the Bahia Honda 
convoy. Three hours later the airship Los Angeles also found the Bahia Honda force and 
reported its location before being ruled destroyed by gunfire from the Black warships. At 
1520, the Lexington finally steamed into range and launched a force of 33 aircraft in 
response to these contact reports. Its pilots soon discovered that the Black force was 75 
miles away, not 40 miles, on a slightly different bearing than previously reported. Despite 
the erroneous position report the Lexington’s aircraft managed to attack the Langley late 
in the afternoon.6  
The scout bombers in the attack force returned to the carrier safely in daylight, but 
the unexpected difference in distance and miscommunication over the Lexington’s 
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expected position meant that the remaining aircraft, including some ever-troublesome 
Martin/Great Lakes torpedo bombers, could not make it back to the Lexington before the 
sun set shortly after 1800 and thus were forced to make night carrier landings, among the 
first of their kind. Captain King, fearing the loss of the aircraft, ordered the carrier’s 
lights turned on so that the pilots could find it in the darkness. Fortunately for the pilots, 
as well as King’s career, all aircraft returned to the carrier safely, allowing it to retire to 
the east during the night.7 
Meanwhile, the Saratoga tracked the efforts of several Blue vessels tailing the 
Port Culebra convoy during the night, and by the morning of 19 February was positioned 
due west of the Black convoy. Unfortunately for the carrier, the Port Culebra convoy had 
nearly reached its final destination by this time, thus giving the Saratoga little time to halt 
the advance. The Saratoga launched an attack force of 62 aircraft even before its scouts, 
which had launched at dawn, found the Black force. When the scouts failed to find the 
Port Culebra convoy, the attack force returned to the carrier for refueling, wasting even 
more valuable time. Finally, at 1100, the attack force launched again after receiving 
confirmation of the Black position. The Saratoga’s aircraft attacked the convoy 
successfully, but records are unclear as to the exact damage caused by the attack. One of 
the torpedo squadrons sent out as part of the attack force returned to the carrier nearly 
two hours late, preventing the Saratoga from launching a follow-up strike that day. The 
Saratoga launched more air attacks the next morning, 20 February, but operations for 
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both fleets off Nicaragua ceased at 1000 after the arrival of the Black convoy at Port 
Culebra.8 
 The Lexington continued to operate against the Bahia Honda convoy on 20 
February, launching an air attack against it that morning, but the record is again thin as to 
the damage caused or losses in aircraft suffered. At 1120, the Black cruiser Pensacola 
sighted the Lexington, and King responded by launching 13 aircraft to attack the cruiser.  
Meanwhile, the Lexington’s plane guard destroyers and the light cruiser Cincinnati 
sprang to the carrier’s defense, with the destroyers promptly laying a smoke screen. The 
combined efforts of the aircraft and the Lexington’s escorts sank the Pensacola, but at the 
cost of the Cincinnati. That afternoon flights of 26 and 27 aircraft, respective ly, launched 
from the Lexington against the Bahia Honda convoy at 1417 and 1455 failed in their last 
ditch efforts to stop the Black convoy before the problem was terminated at 1800.9 
 The greatest handicap upon the carrier operations Fleet Problem XII stemmed 
from the scenario itself. Blue could not concentrate its air power effectively since both 
canals required protection, and a single carrier stood little chance of stopping a large, 
well-defended surface force. Despite the failure of the Blue carriers to stop the Black 
advance, imbalanced fleets would become commonplace as parts of Fleet Problem 
scenarios during Admiral Pratt’s tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, which had begun 
in late 1930. Beginning with Fleet Problem XII, the remaining exercises of Pratt’s term 
featured imbalanced fleets, and only in Fleet Problem XIII would the Lexington and 
Saratoga be divided among opposing fleets.   
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 Throughout Problem XII, both the Lexington and Saratoga operated at or near 
their maximum speeds, which clearly he lped protect themselves against surface attacks 
like those that had damaged both carriers in previous exercises. This was especially true 
for the Lexington during its engagement with the Pensacola on the final day of the 
exercise. The exercise demonstrated that the carriers could be difficult beasts to trap and 
kill when they sailed at high speed and took evasive action, but the cost of this 
maneuvering was high in terms of fuel consumed. By the end of the exercise the carriers 
had consumed nearly two thirds of their fuel and there were no nearby sources of 
replenishment. Thus, despite the newly developed abilities of carriers to refuel their 
escorts, the operations of the carriers remained limited by their dependence upon a 
logistical tail.  
 Though one might expect Reeves to be disappointed with the results of Fleet 
Problem XII, he did see some positives in the carriers’ performance. At the critique, 
Reeves stated that: 
In general terms I believe the results of this problem clearly and conclusively 
show that the air force cannot stop the advance of battleships and prevent them 
from carrying out landing operations, that battleships and air force are mutually 
dependent, that battleships and air force operating together mutually increase the 
effectiveness of each other, that the air force directly affects battleship deign in 
the matter of maximum gun range by making gun fire effective at long ranges by 
means of aircraft spotting. Twice in Problem Twelve the BLUE carriers would 
have been destroyed by BLACK battle ship gun fire had BLACK possessed an air 
force adequate for controlling his gun fire.10 
 
Reeves’ career record clearly shows greater interest in practical experience with carrier 
aviation rather than becoming a shrill, Billy Mitchell-esque advocate for carrier aviation 
or even a slick, bureaucratic manipulator like Admiral Moffett. Reeves’ comments, while 
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acknowledging the failure of the carriers, demonstrate that he believed that the carriers 
and battleships had become dependent upon each other to reach the ir maximum 
effectiveness.    
 Admiral Pratt’s reaction to Fleet Problem was similar to that of Reeves. Pratt, not 
known as a particularly outspoken advocate for carrier aviation, had testified during Billy 
Mitchell’s court martial proceedings to rebut Mitchell and Admiral William Sims’ claims 
that Naval War College war games had proven that battleships were obsolete. The results 
of Problem IX certainly opened his eyes to the potential of carrier air power, and he cited 
the events of that exercise during a speech Pratt gave at the Naval War College in August 
1929. In the speech, he chided some in the naval establishment by saying that, “… the 
naval point of view is so generally fixed upon the idea of the battleship as the striking 
arm that it was not entirely ready to accept the idea that the real striking force may, if the 
situation demands it, consist almost entirely of an air force properly supported.”11  
Pratt’s support for carrier aviation may not have been as deep as the Naval War 
College speech might ind icate. During the extreme budget cuts in the early years of the 
Depression, Pratt supported efforts to place the Saratoga and Lexington in a rotating 
reserve system whereby one carrier was in commission while the other would be 
temporarily decommissioned. Opposition from numerous quarters, particularly the 
General Board, put a stop to any such scheme on the basis that little savings would be 
realized because of the costs associated with decommissioning and re-commissioning 
vessels. The scheme fit into a broader trend where Pratt would support policies unpopular 
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in naval circles, such as the 1922 and 1930 naval limitations treaties, for the sake of 
aligning himself more closely to overall government policy. 12  
 In the critique following Fleet Problem XII, Pratt stated, “…that the battleship is 
still the backbone of the Fleet.” Pratt saw that the Blue fleet could effectively locate 
enemy forces for much of the problem, but was wholly incapable of delivering enough 
firepower to halt the Black advance. Underneath the rhetoric, Pratt still appeared to hold 
carrier aviation’s value in high regard. Though Pratt acknowledged the fact that the Black 
fleet had reached its objectives during the exercise, he concluded that Black’s 
effectiveness was “handicapped” by the lack of air support throughout the exercise. 13 
Regardless of Pratt’s exact stance on the matter, the next two Fleet Problems during his 
term as the Chief of Naval Operations continued testing the value of independent carrier 
operations.  
 The media coverage for Fleet Problem XII compared with that of Fleet Problem 
IX in terms of scope, and at least one article recounting the events in the exercise rated a 
placement on the front page. Hanson Baldwin, the Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist, 
covered the exercise for the New York Times. Not surprisingly, the media coverage for 
the exercise focused on the “battleship versus carrier” controversy much more than any 
participating naval officers during or after the exercise. One headline nearly six weeks 
before the start of the exercise read “Major Aircraft Test in Coming War Games.” The 
apparent success of the Blue Fleet in their attacks on Black garnered a front-page story, 
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“Planes Save Panama From ‘Enemy’ Attack In Naval War Game,” in which Baldwin 
described the aerial attacks upon the Black fleet as “another feather in the cap of 
aviation” and “a symbol of the new era of naval warfare.” Later articles tempered 
Baldwin’s optimism, as it became known that Black successfully reached both objectives, 
with one later headline reading “Battleship Stands as Navy’s Backbone.” Within this 
article, Baldwin wrote: 
Despite the advance in aerial warfare and the splendid performance of the flying 
fleet in the war problem just concluded, naval officers pointed out that the heavily 
armored, powerfully gunned battleship, the only man of war able to take as well 
as give punishment, is still the backbone of the fleet and promises to remain so for 
years to come, unless it is abolished in all navies by international agreement.14 
  
 Fleet Problem XII also became fodder for Congressional debates concerning 
naval appropriations. Soon after the exercise, Pratt and Reeves reported to Representative 
Fred Britten, the Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, who later declared that, “It is 
interesting to note that even the aviation enthusiasts of the navy now admit the superiority 
of the battleships.”15  
A debate on the floors of Congress occurred on the same day as Britten’s 
statement to the Times over the authorization for reconstructing the three New Mexico-
class battleships. Britten cited the success of the battleships in Fleet Problem XII as 
justification for the expense during the heated proceedings. Fiorello LaGuardia leveled a 
particularly wild accusation towards the navy and its motives behind choosing Fleet 
Problem XII’s scenario: 
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It has been stated, not by legislators but by the best naval experts in the world, 
that it is expected never again to build a battleship, as these battleships pass out; 
and yet at the last moment this appeal is staged in a manner as only the navy can 
do it. The Navy has the best publicity department of any concern in this country. 
They have an unofficial report of the referees telling us that the Black Fleet seized 
Panama and established a base there. What did they do? They put all the 
[battle]ships in the Black Fleet and they put one [battle]ship and aviation in the 
Blue Fleet. 
…. and if this were an appropriation for naval aviation, the other fleet would have 
suffered the same kind of defeat. This is not the first time the Navy has pulled 
something like this at the psychological moment. They are very ingenious down 
at the Navy Department.16 
 
In spite of LaGuardia’s accusations, the measure passed and all three New Mexico-class 
underwent modification during the early 1930s.17  
 It should also be remembered that carrier against battleship engagements during 
World War II in open waters did not point to aerial supremacy until the latter years of the 
conflict. For instance, the sinking of the Bismarck could only have occurred because of a 
single Swordfish torpedo plane striking the battleship’s rudder, but gunfire and torpedoes 
from British battleships and cruisers were still required to sink the German battleship. 
The fear of surface attacks clearly guided the actions of some American naval 
commanders in the Pacific, particularly those of Admiral Raymond Spruance during the 
Battle of Midway. 18  
Engagements resembling that created for Fleet Problem XII were somewhat rare 
during World War II. Had Spruance and Yamamoto been eager to continue the fighting 
around Midway following the destruction of the Japanese carriers, this certainly would 
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have resembled Fleet Problem XII. The carrier raids upon Taranto in 1940 and Pearl 
Harbor in 1941 certainly demonstrated the power of carrier attacks upon battleships, but 
are more attributable to the poor states of readiness in both the Italian and American 
fleets.  
One clear example of a carrier against battleship engagement occurred in June 
1940. During the British withdrawal from Norway, the German battlecruisers 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau surprised and sank the carrier Glorious. The carrier had no 
aircraft operating at the time and the two escorting destroyers steamed far ahead of the 
carrier, creating a situation at the time of the attack reminiscent of those encountered by 
American carriers in the Fleet Problems. Yet, despite the caveats, this early war 
engagement demonstrated the continued vulnerabilities of carriers to attacks from surface 
vessels. Not until the appearance of the massive air armadas of the U.S. Navy’s Fast 
Carrier Task Force was this debate clearly resolved in favor of carrier air power.19 
 Perhaps the biggest change to result from Fleet Problem XII came in the design of 
new aircraft carriers. The last two years of operating experience, the Fleet Problems 
included, demonstrated the value of the Lexington-class carriers and their abilities to 
operate independently of the fleet. Beginning in March 1931, a design study examined 
the most effective ways to distribute the remaining 55,200 tons allowed under the 
Washington treaty, and the study recommended the construction of three 18,400-ton 
carriers later that spring. However, Pratt reasoned that pairs of carriers of similar 
characteristics made more sense, proposing instead two 20,000-ton carriers and a single 
15,200-ton carrier comparable to the Ranger. Following hearings during the summer, the 
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General Board endorsed Pratt’s scheme that fall, stating, “… it is believed that no carrier 
of less than 18,000 tons, approximately, can be given the necessary speed and protection 
to make it well suited for all the duties required of carriers.”20  
 Although carrier aviation could have suffered a setback following Fleet Problem 
XII, one was not forthcoming. Though likely disappointed with the results of the 
exercise, Pratt and Reeves called for a more balanced and complementary fleet operations 
afterwards. Carrier aviation had not lost its standing, and its work over the previous few 
years was rewarded, in one sense, by the change in carrier designs that came later that 
year. 1931 was a good year for carrier aviation, and the carriers would have more chances 
to prove themselves in the next two years as the Fleet Problems continued to have 
imbalanced forces.   
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CHAPTER VII 
PRICELESS ASSETS IN WAR: GRAND JOINT EXERCISE 4 AND FLEET 
PROBLEM XIII 
Fleet Problem IX demonstrated that carriers could be effectively used as 
platforms from which to strike high value targets ashore, in that case the Panama Canal.  
Despite this, the use of carriers returned, in the next three fleet problems, to scouting for 
the main battle fleet with an emphasis placed on integrating the operations of the new 
carriers into those of the fleet as a whole. Thus the scenarios that guided Fleet Problems 
X-XII, while allowing for the testing of many worthwhile developments in carrier 
operations, particularly the granting to the carriers of a certain degree of independence 
from the remainder of the fleet, did not provide carrier aircraft with an opportunity to 
deliver a knockout blow against a target ashore similar to the one they delivered against 
the Panama Canal in Problem IX. Naval aviators did get the opportunity to demonstrate 
their capabilities in a different context in 1932, i.e., in Grand Joint Exercise 4 (GJE 4). 
Both GJE4 and Fleet Problem XIII, held immediately after GJE4, focused on different 
aspects of expeditionary warfare, but the operations of the carriers would impact both 
exercises.  
The Army-Navy Grand Joint Exercises were usually he ld in conjunction with the 
Navy’s fleet problems. In 1923, the same year as Fleet Problem I, the army and navy 
staged a Combined Exercise in the Panama Canal Zone. The following year, Fleet 
Problem III, also called Joint-Army and Navy Problem Two, again tested the 
vulnerability of the canal. The Langley participated in this exercise, protecting the Black 
Fleet as it sailed from a hypothetical starting point in the Azores and launching air attacks 
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with its meager air group on the Gatun Locks. Following this exercise, the Joint Board 
created guidelines dividing joint exercises into two categories, with the moniker “Grand 
Joint Exercise” being applied only to those exercises where one or all of the major U.S. 
Fleet commands (Scouting Fleet, Battle Fleet, etc.) participated.1  
 The Langley participated in Grand Joint Exercise 3 in 1925 as part of the Blue 
fleet tasked with the invasion of Hawaii. However, the umpires grounded its aircraft for 
the entire exercise, forcing the Marines to conduct landing operations without air cover. 
The Navy later charged that the Army forced the aircraft grounded to promote land-based 
aircraft’s ability to provide coastal defense.2  
 For the next seven years, no other Grand Joint Exercises were held. In 1926, the 
Joint Board decided to not hold a Grand Joint Exercise during the winter of 1927 because 
the fleet concentration would be in Panama, and the first two major joint exercises had 
recently been held there. Reasons of cost, scheduling, and a lack of variety in potential 
targets likely prevented the scheduling of a Grand Joint Exercise for the next five years, 
although minor joint exercises were held frequently during this period. Finally, in 
December 1930, the Joint Board called for a Grand Joint exercise to be held in Hawaii in 
February 1932.3   
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The scenario for GJE4 pitted the United States against a coalition of Pacific and 
Atlantic nations. During the conflict, American naval forces achieved victory over Black 
naval forces in the Atlantic, forcing their retreat, but as the combat raged in the Atlantic, 
a member of the Black coalition in the Pacific invaded the Hawaiian Islands, then 
withdrew westward, leaving behind a garrison of 18,000 men, numerous aircraft, and 15 
submarines to defend the islands. The Blue (U.S.) Fleet, under the command of Admiral 
Richard Leigh, was to retake the islands through amphibious landings. Leigh divided his 
forces into multiple parts, with the carriers Lexington and Saratoga and seven destroyers 
comprising the Advanced Raiding Force under Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell. The carriers 
had the responsibility of reducing the defenses of Oahu and attaining air superiority 
before the landings occurred.4  
 The Advance Raiding Force sailed from the West Coast on 1 February, and, as it 
continued westward, the two carriers used their refueling capabilities developed after 
Fleet Problem IX to top off the bunkers of the escorting destroyers on 5 February. The 
course of Yarnell’s force took it to the north of Molokai, and, by the morning of 7 
February, the two carriers reached the first designated launching point about 40 miles 
northeast of Oahu. There, despite rough seas, high weather, and overcast weather, the 
carriers launched their planes.5  
 For this exercise, the carriers experimented with a different deployment scheme 
for their aircraft. At the suggestion of Captain John Towers, who served as Admiral 
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Yarnell’s chief of staff, planes were divided into homogeneous air groups, with most of 
the Saratoga’s 97 aircraft being fighters, while the Lexington carried 58 bombing and 
torpedo aircraft. This arrangement did not assign all the striking power to the Lexington 
since the fighters carried by the Saratoga, many of which were Boeing F4Bs, could 
deliver up to 200 pounds of bombs. Towers believed that such a deployment would allow 
for quicker response times because the carriers would not have to rearrange aircraft if a 
particular type were required for a mission. On the negative side, this also meant that a 
single well-placed strike by enemy forces could cripple entire portions of the naval air 
force. This was readily apparent to members of the naval hierarchy, who viewed the 
standard mixed aircraft complements as a “lesser evil” than the potential problems that 
could arise from such strikes. While the division of aircraft would not hinder the carriers’ 
operations during the exercise, the Navy’s fears combined with the inability to amass 
multiple carrier task forces due to a scarcity of available units shelved the idea for future 
exercises.6 
At 0530, both carriers began launching aircraft as a part of Raid Plan No. One. 
The 150 attacking aircraft struck their targets between 0600 and 0700. Those from the 
Saratoga’s focused their attacks on aircraft and anti-aircraft defenses at Wheeler Field, 
the main Army airbase on the island, with a smaller number of planes hitting Luke Field 
and Rodgers Airport, and a few making strafing runs on Ford Island in Pearl Harbor 
before returning to the carrier. Meanwhile, the Lexington’s aircraft attacked various 
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installations at Schofield Barracks, including an ammunition depot and a chemical depot. 
Aircraft from both carriers also conducted scouting missions, including photographic 
reconnaissance of airfields and conditions at the landing beaches. Umpires assessed the 
attacking force with 26 aircraft losses, though more than half of these were “replaced” by 
8 February. 7  
During GJE4, much as during Fleet Problem IX, the carriers still proved 
vulnerable during flight operations. A Black submarine, the S-42, sighted the Saratoga at 
a range of 2800 yards while the carrier’s aircraft were aloft. At 0725, during landing 
operations, the submarine launched torpedoes at the Saratoga, with the carrier receiving a 
19 percent damage penalty from the umpire, representing significant damage, but not 
enough to force cessation of flight operations.8  
After recovering their aircraft on the 7th, the Lexington and Saratoga retired to the 
northward, then reversed to a southerly course that took them through the Kauai Channel 
to a refueling point well to the south of Oahu. During the night, a pair of destroyers left 
the Advanced Raiding Force temporarily to conduct a bombardment of Hanapepe Field 
on Kauai. On the afternoon of 8 February, the carriers split into two formations, with the 
Lexington and one destroyer moving south to evade contact with enemy forces, and the 
Saratoga and the remaining destroyers heading northward to attack Oahu. 9  
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At 0515 on 9 February, the Saratoga launched a strike force of 51 attack aircraft 
escorted by 16 fighters. Some of the aircraft attacked Black submarines off Diamond 
Head, but most aircraft attacked ground targets, primarily in the area of Waimanalo, or 
scouted more potential landing beaches. A total of 10 aircraft were judged lost on these 
missions.10  
At 0605 on 10 February, the reconstituted Advanced Raiding Force launched 96 
aircraft for further strikes from a point southwest of Oahu. Soon after the departure of the 
aircraft, a group of Black aircraft attacked both carriers, hitting the Saratoga with a 
2,000-pound bomb that rendered its flight deck inoperable for the remainder of the 
exercise. Both sides suffered heavy aircraft losses during the attacks upon the carriers and 
the concurrent Blue attacks upon ground targets on Oahu. Fortunately for Blue, the 
Saratoga’s remaining aircraft were allowed to transfer to the Lexington, leaving a total of 
52 operable aircraft.11 
On 11 February, the two carriers split again with the Lexington taking up a 
position north of Oahu to cover the landings of troops near Kahuku Point, while the 
Saratoga steamed to Lahaina Roads, a point off the northwest coast of Maui, for repairs. 
Black aircraft attacked the Saratoga again while in transit, bringing its total damage to 70 
percent. The Saratoga got some measure of revenge upon reaching Lahaina by fueling a 
group of seaplanes that eventually sank several submarines and bombed railroad 
junctions on Oahu. 12  
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Meanwhile, the Lexington had considerable success supporting landing operations 
on 12 February. The remaining Blue forces, which had seized Hilo on the Big Island on 7 
February and Lahaina Roads on Maui three days later, finally arrived to land Blue ground 
forces on Oahu’s west coast that morning. Forty-eight of Lexington’s aircraft flew 
missions laying smoke over the landings beaches, photographing enemy positions, and 
attacking roads and rail lines, as well as aircraft on the ground at Ewa Field. By the end 
of the exercise at 1630 on 12 February, only 23 aircraft remained flyable aboard the 
Lexington out of the 155 on it and the Saratoga at the start of the exercise.13   
Grover Loening, an early aeronautical specialist known for developing the widely 
used Loening Amphibian, observed the entire exercise from aboard the Saratoga. In an 
article written after the end of the exercise, Loening showered praise upon the 
performance of the Lexington and Saratoga, which he called “…without doubt the 
greatest mechanical advancements of the day.” Loening was particularly impressed by 
the mobility of the carriers, which he touted as a potentially “priceless asset in war.” He 
also praised the efforts of aviators on both sides of the exercise, especially those aboard 
the two carriers.14 
Loening expressed frustration in concerning the penalties assessed during the 
exercise. He believed that the attacks on 7 February would have destroyed all Army 
aircraft on Oahu, and that the umpire’s failure to assess such a penalty led to the unfair 
near-sinking of the Saratoga on 10 February. Yarnell concurred with Loening in his post-
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exercise report, in which he catalogued the numerous Army aircraft estimated to have 
been destroyed in the attacks. The controversy over the penalties also stemmed from 
Army complaints about the “legality” of attacking on a Sunday morning. 15 
Though the strikes upon Oahu’s airfields and military facilities were impressive, 
some officers questioned the ways in which the carriers were employed. Admiral Frank 
Schofield, the Chief Umpire, believed both sides wasted aircraft by not conserving them 
for the landing operations. He also pointed out the limitations imposed on the Blue carrier 
aircraft since safety requirements forced their launching from closer inshore than would 
occur in wartime. Believing air superiority vital for landings, and that carriers would be 
mauled “in the face of strong defensive aviation,” Schofield suggested that initial landing 
operations should have as their target the capture of an airfield that could be used by 
land-based aircraft to support subsequent landing operations. Though not explicitly 
stated, it is possible that Schofield thought the risk of carrier-supported landings too great 
because there were so few carriers in service.16    
Admiral Yarnell also had concerns with the mission assigned to the carriers. He 
regarded the air attacks on Oahu as a success, regardless of the penaltie s rendered upon 
the Saratoga, but was uneasy with the assigning of the carriers to the task of attacking 
shore defenses. Due to a scarcity of carriers, he felt that they were too valuable to use for 
such missions “when other means are available.” Instead, Yarnell, like Schofield, 
envisioned operations against lesser-defended outlying islands in order to acquire enough 
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airbases for land-based aircraft to accomplish the same tasks, though he did not elaborate 
further on working out the logistical feasibility of such a plan. Yarnell stated in a letter to 
Admiral William Sims, long since retired, that, “I am of the opinion that no fleet, 
however strong it might be in surface forces, could risk a descent on any enemy coast 
unless it were in possession of an air force (carrier-based) greatly superior to that which 
the enemy could put in action against it.” Yarnell’s uneasiness with a strike role against 
land targets would be expressed again following Fleet Problem XIV in 1933.17  
In his critique following the exercise, Rear Admiral Harris Laning, the President 
of the Naval War College and an umpire for the exercise, also noted the mobility of the 
carriers and his belief that such mobility gives naval airpower the initiative over land-
based airpower. However, he questioned the usage of the two carriers against the land-
based targets when the enemy fleet, albeit a small one, still defended the area. Laning 
believed that had a strategy focusing upon eliminating all Black naval units been in place, 
Black aircraft could have been lured from their bases to defend their fleet and destroyed 
in aerial battles by Blue aircraft. Such statements are surprising, given that Fleet 
Problems IX, X, and XI had already demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the 
carriers to air attack. With the ability of the carriers and their escorts to outrun 
submarines and most surface ships, it would seem more logical to exploit their mobility 
as they did during GJE4 and to eliminate the biggest threat to their survival: land-based 
aircraft.18  
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It is curious that Black did not put more effort into scouting the approaches to 
Oahu in the days leading up to the Blue carrier attacks. In a memo written nearly a year 
before GJE4, in March 1931, combined “sea-air” attack was already considered the most 
likely form of attack on the Hawaiian Islands. Despite this warning, the Navy 
successfully launched carrier raids on Oahu in GJE4 and in 1938 as a part of Fleet 
Problem XIX. The men in charge of defending of Oahu in 1941, Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, also failed to implement the scouting 
measures necessary to ensure the security of the island from carrier attack, contributing to 
the success of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s attack on Pearl Harbor.19   
Of the early fleet carrier exercises, GJE4 was the most successful exercise for 
carrier operations, even though Fleet Problem IX’s influence appears to have been 
considerably greater. In GJE4 the carriers received significant damage, such as that 
suffered by the Saratoga by air and submarine attacks and the mauling of both carriers’ 
air groups, but they accomplished their mission and survived the exercise. Absent a 
serious threat from Black naval forces, Blues carriers were able to launch numerous 
attacks upon Oahu from several different directions over the course of six days. The use 
of carrier task forces to neutralize enemy air power on the eve of landings would become 
quite common during the latter phases of the Pacific War, though roles assigned to the 
Lexington’s air group during the landing phases of the exercise —laying smoke, aerial 
reconnaissance, and strikes against enemy transportation facilities—were indicative of 
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the neglect of the U.S. armed services in developing close air support doctrine until 
World War II was upon them.20   
Following GJE4, the fleet stayed in Hawaii to prepare for Fleet Problem XIII in 
March 1932. Fleet Problem XIII combined elements of the fleet engagements in Fleet 
Problems X and XI and featured the heavily skewed fleets that comprised those in Fleet 
Problem XII. In Fleet Problem XIII, the Lexington and Saratoga were divided amongst 
the combatants, but otherwise the scenario, which Admiral Pratt created, resembled that 
of Fleet Problem XII since all of the battleships would be assigned to the Blue fleet.21  
The geographic scenario for Fleet Problem XIII placed the United States in the 
western Pacific with Hawaii representing an eastern American outpost, and Puget Sound, 
San Francisco Bay, and Magdalena Bay on Mexico’s Baja Peninsula representing a chain 
of Black atolls. In the scenario, operations were set to begin two months after the 
outbreak of war, with the Blue forces attempting to seize one of the atolls and transform 
it into an advanced base for further operations against Black territory. Naturally, the 
Black mission was to frustrate the Blue advance using aerial attacks and surface 
engagements, when practicable.22  
                                                 
20 Richard B. Muller, “Close Air Support: The German, British, and American Experiences, 1918-
1941,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Allan. R. Millett and Williamson Murray (New 
York, 1996), 144-190.   
 
21  Initially, it was proposed labeling GJE4 as Fleet Problem XIII, with an elaborate scenario 
stemming from it to become Fleet Problem XIV. Admiral Pratt, dissatisfied with the proposed scenarios, 
instead left GJE4 the same and put forth the scenario that formed the basis for Fleet Problem XIII. See 
Ingersoll to Poteat, 16 June 1931, Records Relating to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923-
1941 (microfilm, 36 reels, National Archives, 1974) reel 14.  
 
22 “U.S. Fleet Problem XIII, March 1932, Report of the Commander In Chief,” Records Relating 
to United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923-1941 (microfilm, 36 reels, National Archives, 1974) 
reel 14, p. 2.  
 89
 Blue forces, under the command of Admiral Richard Leigh, included nine 
battleships, the Saratoga, and a host of smaller vessels. The plan called for Blue warships 
to approach California from the southeast steaming together in a concentrated formation, 
and then to veer northward towards Puget Sound once the destroyers had been fully 
fueled by Blue’s auxiliary vessels. After the fleet changed course, an Offensive Screen 
force under Rear Admiral Joel Pringle comprising the Saratoga, three battleships, and 
several destroyers would take station ahead of the main body and engage any potential 
Black attack forces.23   
Vice Admiral Arthur Willard commanded the Black forces, which were 
comprised primarily of the Scouting Force, as well as both the Lexington and the 
Langley. Though not represented by actual ships in the problem, Black possessed a 
battleship force, albeit one inferior in strength to Blue’s. Willard divided his fleet into 
several parts, with the Lexington forming the centerpiece of the Striking Group under 
Vice Admiral William Standley tasked with intercepting the Blue fleet. Meanwhile, the 
Atoll Guard force, which included the Langley, would patrol a line stretching from 
Magdalena Bay to Puget Sound.24 
The problem began on 8 March.  As Blue forces assembled at Lahaina Roads, a 
line of Black submarines took up station to the east of the Hawaiian chain and attempted 
to monitor Blue’s progress while the bulk of Black’s forces remained on the southern 
California coast. Despite several attacks launched by Blue aircraft based in Hawaii, the 
submarines located the Blue forces at Lahaina on 9 March. On 10 March Black 
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submarines sighted the Blue fleet leaving Lahaina waters and radioed the information 
back to the Black fleet. Both fleets advanced towards each other for the next three days, 
with Blue forces sinking Black submarines on 10 March, 12 March and 13 March. 25 
Significant contact between the two fleets finally came on 14 March. At 0830 
aircraft from the Saratoga, now part of Blue’s Offensive Screen, sighted three cruisers in 
the Black scouting line. A few hours later, aircraft from both the Lexington, stationed 75 
miles behind the Black scouting line, and Saratoga attacked the other carrier nearly 
simultaneously. In the umpire’s assessment of this engagement, the Saratoga got the 
better end since it suffered only 25 percent damage, while the Lexington suffered 38 
percent damage. Because of the confusion stemming from several aircraft sitting on the 
Lexington’s deck at the time of the attack, the umpires assessed the penalties arbitrarily 
rather than by the official maneuver rules, angering Captain Fred McCrary, the 
Saratoga’s commanding officer, who felt his aviators had inflicted more significant 
damage on the Lexington.26   
As the day progressed the two advance forces occasionally exchanged fire 
throughout the day as Black cruisers tracked the Blue Offensive Screen, and aircraft from 
the Saratoga scored 64 percent damage on the cruiser Trenton. As night fell, the Black 
cruisers, which had become scattered during the day, concentrated and tracked the Blue 
Offensive Screen northeastward.27  
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On the morning of 15 March, Black’s cruisers paid a heavy price for continuing to 
track the Blue Offensive Screen. Aircraft from the Saratoga sank the Marblehead and 
Salt Lake City and severely damaged the Louisville. However, these attacks proved to be 
the last that aircraft from the Saratoga would make during the problem. Captain King had 
taken the Lexington away from the Blue formation during the night, making a run to the 
north and then west with the hope of locating the Saratoga. His search paid off and, as 
the Saratoga’s aircraft landed just before dusk on the 15th, planes from the Lexington 
attacked and scored 49 percent damage on the carrier. During the night, the Black 
scouting line, as well as some destroyers, attacked the Blue Offensive Screen and 
delivered the coup de grace to the Saratoga with torpedo fire.28  
As the remainder of the problem progressed, the Lexington took station as part of 
Black’s scouting lines. On 16 March its aircraft inflicted significant damage on the 
Pennsylvania. Black forces had been ordered to protect San Francisco on 17 March while 
Blue forces, rather than continuing for Puget Sound, instead steamed towards Magdelana 
Bay. The two fleets became so widely separated by 18 March that the Chief Umpire 
terminated the exercise at 2000 because the two fleets could not make contact aga in 
before the scheduled termination time.29  
Unlike the other problems from this period, Fleet Problem XIII was not the 
subject of detailed analysis immediately after the exercise, though many officers praised 
the exercise in their reports. In his report, Captain King stated that: 
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In closing, I wish to say that I was a party to the first strategical problem the navy 
ever held, around [Puerto] Rico and Culebra just thirty years ago this winter. I 
have been a party to most of the Fleet Problems held since and I think that this 
problem in its wide scope and by reasons of its nature has been one of the most 
interesting and most profitable exercises in which the fleet has ever engaged.30 
 
Based on the results of the exercise, both Admiral Standley and Admiral Yarne ll 
pleaded for further carrier construction, with Yarnell estimating that six to eight total 
carriers would be needed to conduct a campaign in the Pacific. Though short of units, 
Yarnell recognized the growing power of carrier aircraft when he stated that, “If Pringle 
had, [sic] had another carrier, the enemy cruiser force would have been practically 
annihilated.” Previous problems had taken place in much more confined spaces, but the 
increasing importance of air power combined with the vast spaces of a potential Pacific 
campaign highlighted the need for carriers more than ever.31 
The success of concentrated carrier air power in GJE4 probably made the carrier 
shortage of Fleet Problem XIII appear even more acute. In a memo written to the Chief of 
Naval Operations in June 1932, Yarnell recommended that “carriers should operate in 
company.” This recommendation was contained in a broader series of recommendations, 
which included one saying that the Navy should avoid depending on single carriers fulfill 
all the aerial requirements for a given mission. In a separate memo written a few days 
later, Admiral McNamee recommended that, “…the Saratoga and Lexington, with their 
squadrons, should normally be used as a striking force.” These conclusions likely helped 
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reverse a decision to station the Lexington in the Atlantic with the Scouting Force, and it 
returned to service with the Battle Force in the Pacific by the end of the year.32  
The defense of the carriers was also mentioned frequently in the post-exercise 
reports. Admiral Yarnell noted the similarities between this and previous problems where 
the destruction of the enemy carrier became the priority for each fleet. Admiral Standley, 
in his plea for carrier construction, called for smaller carriers to alleviate the risks of 
having just one carrier perform all aviation roles for a fleet. Carrier escorts were frequent 
topics, with Captain McCrary advocating against further use of battleships as carrier 
escorts.33     
The media reported that GJE 4 and Fleet Problem XIII were intended to influence 
Japanese foreign policy. During the spring of 1932, international attention focused upon 
the Japanese seizure of Manchuria that began with its invasion of the territory in 
September 1931. Increasingly frustrated by Japan’s refusal to withdraw from the area, 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson suggested to President Hoover that portions of the 
Asiatic Fleet be sent to Shanghai as a demonstration of American resolve. Hoover 
rejected the advice but allowed the naval exercises to proceed as previously planned.  
Some members of the media did not think that the timing of the maneuvers in Hawaii was 
a coincidence. An ominous article that appeared in the New York Times just before the 
Battle Force sailed for Hawaiian waters on 30 January denied any change in plans had 
been made as a result of the crisis, yet included a statement from Admiral Leigh stating 
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that the fleet would be “fully prepared for any contingency.” Unlike the 1902/1903 
maneuvers that King alluded to, after which Theodore Rooseve lt claimed to have sent an 
ultimatum to Germany during the maneuvers that forced their withdrawal from the 
Venezuelan crisis, the 1932 exercises had no effect upon the outcome of the Manchurian 
crisis, which continued on for some time afterwards.34  
The level of media exposure of these exercises compared with that of Fleet 
Problems IX and XII, but positive headlines about carrier aviation were not followed 
immediately by articles proclaiming battleship superiority as they had been in the past. 
For instance, one paragraph heading recounting the final days of GJE4 stated “Air Corps 
Proves Worth.” During Fleet Problem XIII, again covered by Hanson Baldwin, one 
dramatic headline stated “Black Carrier Planes ‘Sink’ Carrier Saratoga,” while another 
article reported, “Planes Again Bomb Battleships.” Baldwin, who described Fleet 
Problem XIII as “Mobility Pitted Against Power,” shared the sentiments of the naval 
officers by proclaiming Fleet Problem XIII as the “Greatest Manoeuvre Problem in the 
History of the Service.”35    
Indeed the Lexington and Saratoga did enjoy greater success than in any previous 
exercises and thus merited the positive press coverage that they received, though neither 
the exercises nor the attention focused on the carriers had any immediate impact, i.e., no 
major appropriations or significant design changes emanated directly from these two 
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exercises. Much of this can be explained by the unwillingness of the Hoover 
Administration to spend valuable Depression-era funds upon the Navy. However, the 
successor administration of Franklin Roosevelt, a noted navalist, would not have such 
qualms. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
FAILURES AND REWARDS: FLEET PROBLEM XIV 
Fleet Problem XIV was the last Fleet Problem during Admiral Pratt’s tenure as 
Chief of Naval Operations, as well as the final traditional Fleet Problem conducted before 
the commissioning of the Ranger, the U.S. Navy’s fourth carrier. In Fleet Problem XIV, 
as in some of the most recent exercises, both of the Navy’s fleet carriers, the Saratoga 
and the Lexington, would be the centerpieces of one of the participating fleets. The 
scenario for the exercise anticipated their aircraft launching strikes against positions on 
the West Coast of the United States, but poor planning by the Black fleet commander 
limited their impact. In spite of the failure of carrier aviation to perform as well as its 
promoters hoped in Fleet Problem XIV, the new Roosevelt administration authorized 
further carrier construction, thus laying the foundation of American carrier air power in 
the early years of World War II. 
Initially, as the Navy planned Fleet Problem XIV, some question existed as to 
whether the concentration should take place off the Pacific coast of the United States or 
further south off Panama. Admiral Pratt ordered scenarios developed for each location 
before scheduling considerations led to the decision to hold the exercise off California, 
Oregon, and Washington. Unfortunately, a plan to have the U.S. Army participate in the 
exercise fell through for financial reasons, meaning that Fleet Problem XIV would be 
unable to properly test the coastal defenses in California. Regardless, Admiral Pratt had 
again created a scenario requiring the use of independent carrier forces in a Fleet Problem 
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since the Black fleet, which included the two fleet carriers, would not have any 
battleships.1  
Fleet Problem XIV’s scenario hypothesized an imminent war between Blue, the 
United States, and Black, a Pacific nation. Admiral Luke McNamee commanded the Blue 
Fleet, which was composed of the U.S. Battle Force, minus the Lexington and Saratoga. 
Under plans for the exercise, the Blue Fleet would remain on the West Coast and await 
constructive reinforcements from the Scouting Force, which was usually stationed in the 
Atlantic. Meanwhile, a Black naval force under Vice Admiral Frank H. Clark, comprising 
the Lexington and Saratoga, heavy cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliary vessels was 
presumed to have left its homeland in January with its ultimate destination unknown to 
Blue. Black’s orders were to conduct raids upon the West Coast, specifically Puget 
Sound, San Francisco, and the San Pedro-San Diego area, before the expected arrival of 
the Scouting Force from the Atlantic on 18 February.2  
 Admiral McNamee made the two California locales the focal points for his Blue 
fleet’s defensive efforts, which called for the establishment of picket lines of cruisers and 
destroyers 100 and 125 miles out to sea, respectively, with an inner picket line of 
battleships available to respond to any potential threat. The group assigned to defend San 
Francisco also received the Langley under Rear Admiral Frank Halligan as its air 
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detachment. In addition, Blue also had several squadrons of land-based aircraft at all 
three expected target areas.3  
 The Northern Carrier Group comprising the Lexington and three heavy cruisers 
under the command of Vice Admiral William H. Standley planned to attack the San 
Francisco area on 16 February, and then attack the Puget Sound area on the following 
day, or as soon as conditions permitted. Meanwhile the Southern Carrier Group, which 
included the Saratoga and three heavy cruisers, commanded by Rear Admiral Yarnell 
was to attack only the San Pedro area on 16 February since the San Diego area, with 
stronger defenses, was deemed too dangerous for the force to approach. Following the 
attacks, the Saratoga was to steam out to sea in a northwesterly direction until it reached 
a position from which its planes could attack San Francisco on 17 February. Thus, the 
attack plan anticipated the Black fleet moving well away from the San Pedro area by 18 
February, the expected arrival date of Blue’s reinforcements.4  
 In the planning stages, Admiral Clark assigned the destroyers to protection of the 
Support Force rather than to escorting the carriers. This left only cruisers to accompany 
the carriers, and, being less maneuverable than destroyers, the cruisers could not steam as 
close to the carriers during flight operations as the smaller destroyers, and thus they could 
not respond as quickly to rescue any pilots whose planes crashed during take off and 
landing operations. In addition to the safety risk, the use of the cruisers as plane guards 
could potentially downgrade the quality of protection they could provide the carrier. 
Clark based his decision on the limited fuel capacity of the destroyers, feeling that their 
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need to refuel would slow the carriers and perhaps cost them the element of surprise 
before they launched their air attacks. Rear Admiral Thomas J. Senn, the Fleet Umpire 
for Blue, later stated that the fuel situation should have been constructively modified so 
that the destroyers could have accompanied the carriers. The decision by Admiral Clark 
to remove the destroyers from the carrier groups, when combined with communication 
breakdowns over the course of the exercise, would prove disastrous for the Lexington.5  
 The carrier groups began the problem in Hawaiian waters, with the Northern 
Carrier Group several hundred miles to the north of Oahu, while the Southern Carrier 
Group and the Support Group that contained Black’s destroyers and tankers, began well 
to the South. Both carrier groups steamed eastward uneventfully for the first four days of 
the problem, which began on 10 February, because the rules of the exercise prevented 
Blue forces in Hawaii from tracking either carrier group at the start of the problem.6  
The Northern Carrier Group veered northward on the night of the 14th after 
sighting lights, and at 0230 on the 15th, the Louisville, one of the Lexington’s escorting 
cruisers, reported sighting a destroyer and intercepting an apparent contact report that 
forced the entire formation to increase speed and to take evasive action by increasing 
speed and zigzagging until daylight. Later that afternoon, a patrol plane from the 
Lexington reported sighting smoke emanating from a surfaced submarine. In all three 
cases, the apparent sightings later proved erroneous, but caused a change in the group’s 
formation in which all three cruisers took station ahead of the Lexington. Worsening 
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weather conditions reduced visibility so much that the Lexington lost sight of the cruisers 
by 0100 on the 16th, leaving the carrier vulnerable to attack.7  
Upon reaching the launching point alone, and with weather conditions poor 
enough to prevent the carrier from launching its aircraft, Standley directed the Lexington 
to steam away from the launching point temporarily to resume searching for the cruisers. 
A Blue destroyer sighted the Lexington during its fruitless search for the cruisers, which 
forced the carrier to attempt radio contact with its missing escorts. The carrier returned to 
the launching point at 0605, but, as the aircraft warmed up on the flight deck, two Blue 
battleships opened fire on it. Making the disaster complete, the missing Black cruisers 
finally stumbled into the area as the Lexington attempted to escape and got caught in the 
crossfire between the two battleships, with all three Black cruisers and the Lexington 
ruled sunk.8 
Fortunately for Black, the Southern Carrier Group successfully evaded detection 
during its mission. On the afternoon of 14 February, the group changed course to the 
north to avoid a potential sighting by a merchant vessel, and in the process, entirely by 
luck, managed to steam around a line of Blue submarines stationed in its path. Upon 
resuming an easterly course, the group entered the Santa Barbara Channel early on 16 
February, and reached the designated launching point at 0625.9 
The Saratoga’s aircraft successfully attacked numerous targets in the Los Angeles 
area, destroying more than fifteen aircraft on the ground, most of them at a reserve base 
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in Long Beach. Aircraft from the carrier also attacked the seaplane tender Gannet and a 
transport, with the Gannet judged to be 50 percent damaged. Other aircraft struck an oil 
refinery in Venice, an oil field in El Segundo, and a powerhouse and docks in the Long 
Beach area before returning to the Saratoga.10  
Once the strike aircraft departed the carrier, the Saratoga launched another group 
of aircraft assigned to protect the task force. These aircraft soon sighted the Blue light 
cruiser Milwaukee and the battleship Pennsylvania in the vicinity. Much as during past 
fleet problems, the Saratoga used its superior speed to escape potential foes, leaving its 
cruiser escorts to attack the Blue vessels. The carrier eventually recovered the returning 
strike aircraft at 0852, and the entire Southern Carrier Group spent the next three hours 
intermittently engaging various Black vessels, sinking two. During this time, a group of 
eight land-based dive-bombers attacked the Saratoga at 1000, destroying 20 aircraft and 
rendering its aft flight deck inoperable for two hours.11  
Despite the damage to the Saratoga’s from the air attack and to its escorts in the 
surface engagements, the Southern Carrier Group managed to escape northward, reaching 
the designated launching point for the San Francisco attacks off of Point Sur at 0502 on 
17 February. Within an hour of its arrival, the group sighted the Blue cruiser Richmond, a 
destroyer, and the battleship New York at very long range, but Admiral Yarnell decided to 
remain in position hoping to get his aircraft aloft before being attacked by the enemy. As 
the Saratoga began launching aircraft at 0627, two seaplanes from the Richmond and 21 
aircraft from the Langley attacked the Saratoga. The Langley had steamed to the 
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southeast following the destruction of the Lexington, reaching a point in Monterrey Bay 
early on the 17 March from which it launched its attack. Despite the chaos, the 
Saratoga’s aircraft successfully got airborne before the New York and the cruiser Raleigh 
attacked the Southern Carrier Group. During this engagement, which proved to be the 
finale to the exercise, the umpires ruled the attacks left Saratoga’s flight deck inoperable 
for 38 hours and that, lacking an operable ship to return to, its 36 aircraft were 
destroyed.12  
The Saratoga’s aircraft avenged their carrier when 18 of them attacked the 
Langley, rendering its flight deck inoperable for nearly three hours, and various targets in 
San Francisco Bay, including Crissey Field, Hunter’s Point, the San Francisco docks, and 
the San Andreas Reservoir.13  
 Following the exercise, several officers criticized Admiral Clark’s plans for the 
exercise. Admiral Yarnell, Captain C. A. Blakely (Lexington’s commanding officer), and 
Admiral Richard H. Leigh, CinCUS and the Chief Umpire for the exercise, disagreed 
with the priorities established in Admiral Clark’s plans, which called for air strikes upon 
land targets before enemy naval forces in the area had been neutralized. Yarnell later 
recommended as a part of the annual CINC Battle Force report submitted in May that, 
“…future problems stress naval rather than shore objectives, as more proper targets for 
the fleet air force.”14  
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Yarnell and Blakely also noted the additional risk of making attacks against land 
targets with aircraft that Yarnell described as “obsolescent.” While the speed of the scout 
planes and dive-bombers pleased Yarnell, he estimated that the carrier’s Martin/Great 
Lakes torpedo bombers were so slow that they added an hour to the total time the 
carrier’s attack force spent in the air. Though having been judged unreliable for half a 
decade, some of these torpedo planes would be kept in service another five years, until 
1937, when Douglas TBD Devastators replaced the last TG-2s.15 
 Like most of the early 1930’s Fleet Problems, Fleet Problem XIV received media 
coverage, with Hanson Baldwin again covering the exercise for the New York Times. The 
sinking of the Lexington and the raid on San Francisco by the Saratoga’s aircraft received 
prominent headlines, as one would expect. However, one new aspect to the coverage of 
this exercise compared to previous fleet problems was a domestic security angle. An 
article titled “’War’ Shows Trend of Naval Strategy” that preceded the start of Fleet 
Problem XIV speculated on the defensibility, or lack thereof, of the West Coast. The fact 
that the Army, which bore primary responsibility for coastal defense, did not participate 
in the exercise probably lessened the impact of the article, but the article was still 
important, because it was probably one of the first times that a popular publication 
emphasized the threats carrier-based aircraft posed to coastal areas.16   
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Fleet Problem XIV was a doctrinal disappointment and deemed a failure by many 
senior naval leaders. Officers, regardless of their affiliation with carrier air power, were 
unhappy with the planning for Fleet Problem XIV, and it may have cost Admiral Clark 
future commands.17 Though the Saratoga survived its encounters with the Blue fleet, 
there were precious few new lessons learned from the exercise. In many ways, Fleet 
Problem XIV represented a step backwards from GJE4, which had at least shed light 
upon the possibilities of concentrated carrier airpower and demonstrated the value of the 
fleet carriers’ mobility. Despite the promise of carrier air power directed against shore 
targets shown in Fleet Problem IX and GJE4, it would appear that some aviators, like 
Admiral Yarnell, still felt the best arena for the carrier to make a contribution was in a 
fleet action. Though Yarnell complained about Clark’s emphasis on shore targets in 
planning Fleet Problem XIV, it should be noted that the majority of the Saratoga’s 
aircraft launched on the final morning of the exercise headed for targets in San Francisco 
Bay, and not the several Blue surface vessels within sight of the carrier. 
Several months after Fleet Problem XIV, in June 1933, authorization was finally 
approved for the construction of two additional carriers. Two years of design work 
culminated in the two carriers, later named the Yorktown and Enterprise. Several features 
of their design were influenced by the experiences of the Lexington and Saratoga in the 
fleet problems. The design of the Yorktown-class marked the Navy’s shift away from 
merely maximizing the number of flight decks and towards emphasizing certain 
capabilities of carrier design, or, basically, the victory of quality over quantity. The 
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Yorktown and Enterprise, despite being 40 percent smaller than the Lexington and 
Saratoga in terms of displacement, could steam as fast as and launch as many aircraft in a 
single strike as their predecessors. Some of the weight savings on the Yorktown-class 
carriers came from a reduced armament because the eight-inch batteries on the Lexington 
and Saratoga proved superfluous as the number of escort vessels increased. The new 
carriers’ armor scheme also clearly reflected the encounters of the Lexington and 
Saratoga in the fleet problems with “enemy” surface ships because the side armor belts 
could protect the Yorktown-class from up to six-inch shellfire. Unlike the Essex-class 
carriers designed just prior to World War II, the Yorktown-class carriers lacked an 
armored hangar deck as protection from aircraft-dropped bombs, and their meager 
torpedo protection, perhaps reflecting the poor state of early-1930s torpedo bombers and 
aerial torpedoes, later proved inadequate during wartime. Whatever faults may have 
existed in the design of the Yorktown-class, they clearly reflected principles derived from 
the fleet problems, even ones later proved incorrect, and also signaled the U.S. Navy’s 
clear interest in independent carrier air power.18  
It should also be noted that the needs demonstrated in and expressed after the fleet 
problems had less to do with the authorization for new carriers than the change from 
Herbert Hoover to Franklin Roosevelt and the accompanying interests and priorities of 
their administrations. Under Hoover, naval strength remained well below the treaty 
limits, and the Depression had also led to the discussion of more draconian measures 
designed to balance the budget, such as the rotating reserve system for naval vessels 
                                                 
18 Norman Friedman, United States Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, 
1983), 83, 90-91, 392, 394. 
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mentioned in Chapter VI. Roosevelt was more interested in providing jobs for the 
unemployed and included funding for naval construction in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act.19    
While designs for the Yorktown and Enterprise benefited the most from the 
carriers’ operational experience, those for the Ranger, nearing completion by mid-1933, 
had also been influenced by lessons learned in the fleet problems. Its initial design 
originally called for a flush-deck ship since pilots believed that the large islands on the 
Lexingtons would interfere with aircraft operations, particularly during landing, by 
disturbing the flow of air over the deck. However, experience showed that even the 
massive islands of those ships did not hinder flight operations, and in fact had the 
advantage of providing a high perch from which to better direct aircraft movements on 
deck, so a small island was added to the Ranger in late 1932. The carrier also had its 
torpedo stowage removed, primarily because of the success of dive-bombing as a means 
of attack and continued dissatisfaction with the Martin/Great Lakes torpedo bombers. 
This decision would in the future prevent the Ranger from carrying more effective 
torpedo bombers, such as the TBD Devastator, when they entered service in the late 
1930s. The Ranger’s inability to support torpedo bombers was a major consideration in 
                                                 
19  Roosevelt had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson and 
had indicated a desire to expand the Navy to the size allowed under the Washington Naval Treaties, though 
Congress did not pass such legislation until well into his presidency. While historians have often viewed 
the inclusion of naval construction under the National Industrial Recovery Act as a subterfuge on the part 
of Roosevelt, a recent study of naval legislation shows that the individual most responsible for naval 
expansion was Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, who consistently proposed 
larger building programs for the Navy than did the more cautious president.  Stephen Svonavec, “Congress 
and the Navy: The Development of Naval Policy, 1913-1947” (Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University, 
2000). Archibald Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New York, 
1972), 284-286 and David Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 
1929-1945 (New York, 1999), 250-252, 389, reflect the traditional approach assigning credit for naval 
expansion to Roosevelt.    
 107
the decision to confine its service to the Atlantic during World War II, while the two 
Lexington-class and three Yorktown-class carriers (including Hornet commissioned 1941) 
formed the backbone of the U.S. Pacific Fleet until the Essex-class carriers began 
entering service in mid-1943.20 
  While the long-term material outlook for U.S. carrier aviation improved with the 
two new carrier authorizations, Fleet Problem XIV demonstrated that not all hurdles had 
been overcome to turn the aircraft carrier into an effective weapon system. Some key 
concepts, such as the independence of a carrier from the main body of the fleet, had 
become commonplace, but technical hurdles remained for the next several years.  
                                                 
20 Norman Friedman, United States Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, 
1983), 72-75. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 1929, the year of Fleet Problem IX, marked a turning point in the development of 
carrier air power. Prior to that time the roles played by aircraft carriers were limited to 
scouting for or protecting the Navy’s surface ships During Fleet Problem IX carriers 
dramatically demonstrated the potential of their aircraft to inflict serious damage on high-
value targets like the Panama Canal. Previously to Fleet Problem IX, most high-ranking 
naval officers viewed aircraft as being of use mainly as scouts for the fleet and as spotters 
for the guns of the battleships. Beginning with Fleet Problem IX carrier aviation, having 
already been institutionally secured in the 1920s thanks to the dogged efforts of Admiral 
Moffett, began to secure a stronger technical and doctrinal foothold within the Navy. 
Although the Lexington and Saratoga would not always have the opportunity to attack 
shore targets, a role they excelled at, in the exercises after Fleet Problem IX, the two 
carriers influenced both the design of new carriers and doctrine developed for the 
employment of those vessels. By 1933, the year when Congress authorized the first two 
Yorktown-class carriers, the Lexington and Saratoga had operated independently of the 
battle line in nearly all of the exercises held since 1929. The two carriers often operated, 
either together or separately depending on the exercise, as an offensive weapons system, 
peaking in 1932 when the two carriers successfully wore down the defenses of Oahu in 
GJE4 and executed numerous successful attacks on enemy vessels in Fleet Problem XIII. 
Though Fleet Problem XIV in 1933 represented a step backwards from the successes in 
the 1932 exercises, and thus disappointed many in the Navy, the authorization of the two 
new carriers demonstrated the U.S. Navy’s faith in carrier aviation.  
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As the Fleet Problems progressed from 1929 to 1933, the operating of the 
Lexington and Saratoga separate from the slower battle line became quite common. 
Cruising in semi- independent task forces presented new challenges, such as determining 
the proper composition of carrier escorts. Many different escort vessel compositions were 
tested during these exercises, with a combination of cruisers and destroyers found to be 
the most effective, but the difficulties encountered by the Lexington in Fleet Problem 
XIV show that this issue had yet to be entirely resolved by 1933. To further illustrate that 
the doctrinal evolution remained incomplete, the carriers would remain tied to the battle 
line in at least one future exercise, Fleet Problem XVIII, in 1937.1    
 The lessons learned in Fleet Problems IX through XIV were reflected in the 
design of the Yorktown-class carriers. The removal of the eight- inch gun mounts and the 
decrease in size of ammunition bunkers required for the guns—the eight- inch batteries of 
the Lexingtons had proven to be superfluous during Fleet Problems IX-XIV, especially as 
more, and better, escort vessels were added to carrier task forces—freed up space in the 
new Yorktown-class carriers that could be utilized for a variety of other purposes. The 
armor scheme of the Yorktown-class, which emphasized protection against shellfire over 
aerial attack, also reflected the experiences of their predecessors since the Lexingtons had 
encountered “enemy” surface vessels several times in the Fleet Problems IX-XIV, with 
several of these encounters resulting in the carrier being ruled sunk. To be sure, numerous 
operating characteristics of the Lexington-class carriers could have been determined 
without the staging of a fleet problem, such as the ability of the carriers to operate aircraft 
                                                 
1 Thomas Wildenberg, Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier 
Air Power (Annapolis, 1998), 163.  
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in poor weather. However, the fleet problems were necessary in determining the kinds of 
missions large aircraft carriers could accomplish in large-scale naval operations. The 
newer carriers would be able to carry larger air groups and launch larger single deck load 
strikes than their predecessors, maximizing American carrier strength while remaining 
within the limits of the interwar naval arms control treaties. 
The deficiencies of early 1930s carrier aircraft proved to be the biggest handicap 
to successful carrier operations in Fleet Problems IX through XIV. The fragility and 
relatively short ranges of the aircraft then in service and safety concerns on the part of the 
Navy prevented the employment of those aircraft to their technical limits. The range of 
strike aircraft, particularly the Martin/Great Lakes torpedo bombers that were also the 
only aircraft capable of carrying large bomb payloads, contributed to the frequent 
encounters with enemy surface ships. The inability to carry large payloads over long 
distances ultimately prevented carrier aircraft from posing a serious threat to the 
battleship during the early 1930s. By the time of Fleet Problem XIII in 1932, carrier 
aircraft had improved to the point that they could “sink” carriers and cruisers, but 
battleships were another matter entirely. The inability to attack a large battleship force 
directly and cause significant damage ultimately led to the decision in Fleet Problem XII 
to employ planes from the Blue carriers against vessels the poorly armored ships in the 
Black fleet’s supply train. 
Its small number of carriers, only three, limited the ways in which the Navy could 
employ carriers in Fleet Problems IX through XIV. This led pleas from several officers, 
not all of them aviators, for further carrier construction. The shortage meant that carriers, 
in the interests of training and operational necessity, could rarely concentrate during the 
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fleet problems, which also prevented the carriers from posing more of a threat to 
battleships. The only time both the Lexington and the Saratoga operated together in a 
single unit, in GJE4, they proved a smashing success, but the other exercises of the early 
1930s did not afford the two carriers another opportunity to work so closely together. 
However, the construction of the Yorktown and Enterprise would help to rectify this 
situation in the latter 1930s.   
Responsibility for the employment of the carriers in Fleet Problems IX through 
XIV was shared by many individuals. Of the Commanders, Aircraft Squadrons who 
participated in these exercises, Admirals Reeves and Yarnell deserve special attention. 
Reeves, who had already turned the obsolete Langley into a functioning carrier by 1929, 
originated the plan to strike the Panama Canal with a task force composed of only the 
Saratoga and a single escorting light cruiser. His call for the creation of an independent 
unit that included a carrier accompanied by cruisers and destroyers began to be 
implemented in the 1930 exercises. The 1932 and 1933 exercises benefited from the 
presence of Yarnell, whose carriers, if not for the disputed penalty against the Lexington 
in Fleet Problem XIII, might have survived all three exercises in which he participated. 
He also vocalized more clearly than his predecessors the biggest problems facing carrier 
aviation’s growth in these exercises: a shortage of carriers and technically immature 
aircraft.   
While the contributions of Reeves and Yarnell should not be undervalued, other 
senior officers, especially those without backgrounds in aviation, also deserve some of 
the credit for the advances in carrier aviation exhibited in Fleet Problems IX through 
XIV. After 1929, most of the admirals, including members of the surface line, who 
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commanded either the Blue or Black fleets allowed the commanders of the carriers in 
their fleets to operate independently. Some problems did arise during the experimentation 
process within the exercises, such as the mating of the Saratoga with the battleships in 
the Blue Offensive Screen during Fleet Problem XIII, and statements made after the 
exercises indicate that few of the non-aviator senior officers believed the aircraft carrier 
could ever supplant the battleship as the focus of fleet operations. However, the record of 
the 1929-1933 exercises shows that, rather than being the conservative “gun club” often 
referred to by historians, the officers commanding the fleets took an interest in 
determining the capabilities of carrier aviation, and often allowed the carriers to steam 
independently in a tactically, though not always a strategically aggressive posture. 
 Admiral William Veazie Pratt, who participated in or assessed nearly all seven of 
the exercises analyzed in this study, was certainly not an innovator or strong public 
advocate of carrier aviation, as were Reeves and Yarnell, but many of the advances made 
in carrier aviation could not have occurred without his support or at least approval. His 
acceptance of Reeves’ plan to attack the Panama Canal arguably made Fleet Problem IX 
the most influential American naval exercise of the 20th century. During Fleet Problem X, 
Pratt strongly endorsed the deployment of carriers in an “offensive screen,” which drew 
upon Reeves’ ideas stemming from Problem IX about carrier units.  The type of carrier 
task force formed to provide such a screen proved to be forerunner of those widely 
employed in the Pacific during World War II.  
 Admiral Pratt’s greatest contribution to Fleet Problems XIII and XIV was his 
construction of the scenarios that forced fleet commanders to rely on the striking power 
of the large carriers as their primary offensive weapons. While much has been written 
 
 
113 
describing the effects that the Fleet Problems of the 1930s had upon various aspects of 
naval warfare, the impact of the scenarios chosen for an exercise, a key element, has not 
received much attention. During Pratt’s tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, the 
scenarios for all three Fleet Problems employed carriers as the centerpieces of one of the 
opposing fleets. In the case of GJE4, the use of the two carriers in a single unit was likely 
at the discretion of Admiral Leigh, the Blue Fleet commander, and Yarnell. It should be 
noted that Joint Board records indicate no interest in holding a Grand Joint Exercise for 
nearly five years prior to GJE4, and that Pratt served, in his capacity as CNO, as a 
member of the Joint Board during the proposal and planning stages for it. While there is 
no documentary evidence concerning Pratt’s involvement in planning Fleet Problem XII 
or proposing GJE4, it is clear that Pratt designed the scenarios for Fleet Problems XIII 
and XIV.  
 The extensive media coverage, as well as other forums for debating the lessons of 
Fleet Problems IX through XIV, such as Congress, newspapers, and magazines, probably 
increased the visibility of carrier aviation among the public, and the coverage became 
generally more positive by 1933. However, success in the fleet problems did not always 
translate into increased funding for development and acquisition of new aircraft, the 
purchase of aviation equipment, or the construction of aircraft carriers. The cost-
conscious and internationalist Hoover Administration and Congress opposed significant 
expansion of the Navy, especially as the Depression worsened. The election of Franklin 
Roosevelt and a Democratic majority in Congress had more to do with the authorizations 
for the first two Yorktown-class carriers than the success of the carriers in the Fleet 
Problems.  
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 For the U.S. Navy, the Fleet Problems provided the best forum for the training of 
officers and enlisted personnel in a combat-like setting, to test new technologies, and 
formulate new doctrine. The exercises also afforded the Navy a vehicle for publicity. In 
Fleet Problems IX through XIV, the U.S. Navy included the Lexington and Saratoga in 
all three of these processes for the first time. Carrier aviation made numerous gains 
during these exercises, and the scenarios for the Fleet Problems began to change as a 
result of their success. A great deal remained unresolved by 1933, but the changes in 
carrier design and the realizations of carrier vulnerabilities were crucial for growth in 
future exercises. Though made in 1929, Admiral Wiley’s assessment of carrier aviation’s 
position after Fleet Problem IX –“We have gone far, yet we have far to go”—continued 
to be valid in 1933.”2 
                                                 
2 “US Fleet Problem IX, January 1929, Report of the Commander In Chief,” Records Relating to 
United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923-1941 (microfilm, 36 reels, National Archives, 1974) 
reel 12, 29.   
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